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Abstract 
 
The Politics of Prison Privatization: Political Strategies of Business and Labor 
By 
 
Thomas Michael Kelly 
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science  
University of California, Berkeley 
Professor Robert Van Houweling, Chair 
What is the political impact of prison privatization? Does prison privatization introduce a new 
political interest group into the criminal justice sphere? Do private prison firms have an incentive 
to push for increased incarceration and do they have the power to succeed? How similar, or 
different, are the political goals and strategies of private prison firms from other groups 
interested in the operation of prisons, such as corrections officer unions? 
 
I argue that the structure of firms sets them apart from other interest groups. The benefits of 
growth flow to all shareholders in a firm, and all shareholders have a stake in the increasing 
profitability of the firm they own. This aligns the concerns of shareholders and reduces conflict. 
In contrast, other groups often have constituents and stakeholders with conflicting interests. 
Labor unions, another politically influential type of interest group, have a fraught relationship 
with growth. If a labor union grows in size, many of the benefits flow not to the incumbent union 
members, but rather to new union members. I argue that this distinction between firms and labor 
unions should manifest in different political strategies where firms are more likely to adopt pro- 
active political strategies aimed at increasing market share and profit, whereas labor unions will 
adopt defensive political strategies aimed at safeguarding the position of their current members. 
This implies that private prison firms have much more to gain from increased incarceration than 
do corrections officer unions. I compare the political activities of private prison firms and 
corrections officer unions and show that private prison firms do appear to value increased 
incarceration more than corrections officer unions. Drawing on a time series cross-sectional 
model, I show that privatization appears to drive increased incarceration in states within the 
United States. These results are robust to a variety of model specifications. These results are not 
driven by political shifts, crime rates, or cost savings. 
 
This dissertation also describes the results of a series of interviews with state legislators and 
lobbyists. Across states, these subject matter experts believe private prison firms are more 
politically proactive, more politically sophisticated, and more supportive of increased 
incarceration than are corrections officer unions.  
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Chapter 1: The Politics of Prison Privatization 
 
Since the early 1980s, use of private prisons in the United States has gone from a 
historical relic to a mainstream practice. By 2016, almost 1.5 million prisoners were held 
in private prisons. These prisoners comprised 18% of federal prisoners and 7% of state 
prisoners.  Private prison firms also staked out territory in immigrant detention centers. 
By 2017, private prison firms held a majority of immigrants detained by the U.S 
government (Cullen, 2018).   
 The spread of private prisons has been controversial, and critics have attacked 
prison privatization on a variety of grounds. Critics have accused private prison firms of 
not investing in reducing recidivism (Anderson, 2010).  Dolovich (2005) argued that 
resorting to privatization to cut operational costs precluded the broader examination of 
the legitimacy of incarceration.  Mukherjee (2014) claimed that private prisons are more 
likely to issue citations to prisoners, thus increasing the average length of sentence served 
by denying time off for good behavior. 
 One of the common claims, and the one of particular interest to political 
scientists, is that the spread of private prisons has introduced a new and powerful pro-
incarceration political interest into the policy sphere. This charge has been leveled by 
both scholars and activists (Anderson, 2010; Ashton & Petteruti, 2011; Gottschalk, 2008; 
Hartney & Glesmann 2012; Mattera, Khan & Nathan, 2003; Sarabi & Bender, 2000). If 
this charge is true, then it may be important to understand the political activities of 
private prison operators when studying criminal justice policies, across the United States. 
 The use of private prisons is not restricted to a particular region, nor to states of a 
certain partisan orientation.  By 1998 the majority of states held at least some prisoners in 
for-profit private prisons. 
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Figure 1.1 
Number of States Utilizing For-Profit Private Prisons Over Time 
1983-2014 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation.  
 
Political Activity of Private Prisons 
 
 In order to support these accusations, observers have tended to focus on either 
political expenditures by private prison firms or actions of their officers and founders.  
For instance, Sarabi and Bender (2000) described the participation of several Corrections 
Corporation of America (now CoreCivic) executives on the Criminal Justice Task Force 
of the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), as well as ALEC’s past support 
of prison privatization, and suggested that private prisons used ALEC to push criminal 
justice policies that increase incarceration. Other critics such as Hartney and Glesmann 
(2012), and Ashton and Petteruti (2011) focused on the political expenditures on 
lobbying and campaigns that they argued are translated into political influence, that can 
be used to push pro-incarceration policies. 
 Private prison firms, and others, challenge this characterization of private prison 
political activity.   The largest private prison company in the United States, CoreCivic, 
unequivocally states that they do not “lobby for or against policies or legislation that 
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would determine the basis for, or duration of, an individual's incarceration or detention” 
(CoreCivic, 2015). 
 Others who have rejected the claim that private prison firms are a source of pro-
incarceration political pressure, emphasize that the most important pro-incarceration 
interest groups are corrections officer unions. Former New Mexico Governor, Gary 
Johnson, argues that: 
Never in that process did I experience any pressure to “fill beds” in the private 
prisons we built. And if I had, it wouldn’t have worked. It might happen 
elsewhere, but it absolutely did not happen in New Mexico when I was Governor. 
Anyone who has actually overseen a prison system and dealt with the politics 
thereof knows that the real pressure to fill cells comes from the public employees’ 
unions intent on keeping their jobs. They consistently lobby against sentencing 
reform and go to war to prevent common sense privatization of inefficient, 
incompetently managed government services (2016, p. 1). 
 
Pfaff (2017, Preface, para. 6) argued that “reformers’ attention should aim at 
individuals who play a much bigger role in supporting punitive policies and driving 
incarceration trends, including state and county politicians with prisons in their districts, 
and at prison guard unions.”   
The most elaborate argument comes from Volokh (2006, 2008, 2010) who 
provided a theoretical framework regarding why private prison firms should be expected 
to spend less on promoting incarceration than corrections officer unions.  Volokh argued 
that in no state are a majority of prisoners held in private prisons. This means that in 
states where corrections officers are unionized and represented by a single union, the 
union has a larger market share, than private prison firms. If pro-incarceration advocacy 
benefits corrections officer unions and private prison firms in proportion to their market 
share, then private prison firms have less incentive to promote incarceration because most 
of the additional incarceration they achieve, would redound to the benefit of unions. 
Volokh argued that privatization in states with corrections officer unions creates a 
collective action problem, where firms can free-ride and unions may also reduce their 
pro-incarceration efforts because some of the increased incarceration will flow to private 
prisons. This implies that privatization of prisons may actually reduce pro –incarceration 
advocacy in states with unionized corrections officers. 
What should we believe? Are private prison firms or corrections officer unions 
pressuring governments to increase incarceration? Do they differ in their support for 
incarceration or in the strategies they choose?  I argue that the debate around private 
prisons and incarceration is both understudied and under-theorized, with insufficient 
attention to differences between private prisons and correction officer unions, and to  
incarceration trends following privatization. In order to understand the differences 
between corrections officer unions and private prison firms, it is helpful to first look at 
pre-existing theories regarding labor unions and firms.  These theories yield a clear 
prediction about the different approaches that corrections officer unions and private 
prison firms should take towards political engagement. I argue that firms should value 
4  
growth much more highly than labor unions, and consequently private prison firms 
should be expected to be more supportive of increased incarceration than are corrections 
officer unions.    
My dissertation, like the work of other interest group scholars, explores how 
various traits of interest groups affects their political engagement. Schattsneider (1960) 
discussed which groups are able to mobilize to pursue political goals. Baumgartner et al 
(2009) asked how certain organized interests are able to prevail in policy disputes. 
Grossman (2012) explored how certain advocacy organizations are able to succeed by 
becoming institutionalized representatives of major political constituencies. I ask not how 
some interest groups are stronger than others, but rather how are the strategies and goals 
of interest groups shaped by their institutional features. Both labor unions and firms 
clearly engage in the political process. But how similar is their approach to politics and 
how does the difference between labor unions and firms shape their political strategies? 
 
Goals of Labor Unions and Firms 
 
 Firms are often viewed as profit-maximizers. Accordingly, a firm will attempt to 
expand to the point where it maximizes profit. When multiple investors or shareholders 
own a firm, each individual owner’s well-being is maximized when the firm maximizes 
profit, with each investor receiving a share of profits proportional to their ownership.  
 The situation of labor unions is very different. What benefits one member of a 
labor union may not benefit another member. For instance, more senior members of labor 
unions, with less to fear from layoffs, may aggressively demand wage increases while 
less senior members may be more concerned about job security (Farber, 1978).  
 Labor unions also face a trade-off between the interests of their current members 
and the interests of their potential, future members. Labor unions are often described as 
labor monopolists (Atherton, 1973; Dunlop, 1944; Reynolds, 1981) which means that as 
the sole provider of labor to an employer, unions are able to set the price of labor, or the 
wage. In response, employers hire the number of workers that maximize profit at that 
wage level. The higher the wage set by the union, the fewer workers that are hired by the 
firms. As such there is a natural trade-off for the union between the wage level and the 
level of employment. If labor unions care only about their current members, who elect 
union leadership, they will not care about increasing the number of jobs provided once all 
union members are employed (Carruth & Oswald, 1987; Lindbeck & Snower, 2002). 
This means that labor unions may face internal objections to growth because they may 
fail to serve the interests of incumbent union members.  
 Firms do not face this trade-off between the interests of incumbent and potential 
shareholders. The pursuit of growth, when profit-maximizing, threatens no corporate 
shareholder and perfectly aligns with their goals. Shareholders benefit when outsiders 
desire to become shareholders as well, because incumbent shareholders can sell their 
share of a company at a higher rate. Incumbent union members do not own their job and 
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they do not have a claim on the income of future members. Raising employment to 
accommodate demand for union jobs may lower their wages.  
What does this difference mean for the political strategies of corrections officer 
unions and private prison firms? Private prison firms should be much more eager than 
corrections officer unions to push for increased incarceration. Incumbent shareholders do 
not have to worry that the growth of a firm dilutes their shareholdings, unlike union 
members who may fear that employment growth is a distraction from pursuing wage 
growth, or that it may even harm wages.  This means that private prison firms should 
value growth more highly than corrections officer unions. While there are many ways a 
private prison firm could seek to grow, one of them is to increase the total size of the 
market for prisons by increasing incarceration.  Consequently, we should expect private 
prison firms to lobby more intensively for incarceration than corrections officer unions, 
all else being equal. 
Why Focus on Prisons? 
 
 These differences between for-profit firms and labor unions are not specific to any 
industry. Why then focus on the difference between corrections officer unions and private 
prison firms?  I focus on prisons because the power to imprison is one of the most 
consequential and fundamental powers of the state. Understanding how policy choices, 
such as the choice to privatize prisons, may shape the politics of incarceration is naturally 
of great interest to political scientists and the broader public.  
 Prisons are also distinct from many other types of government services that have 
been partially privatized in that governments are the only customer of incarceration 
services. Schools may be funded and operated by state and local governments, funded by 
the government and operated by charter organizations, or funded and operated completely 
separate from the government.  Completely private prisons, operated apart from the 
government, would be illegal. As such, all private prison firms are completely dependent 
on favorable government policies, and not on satisfying individual consumer preference. 
Prisoners, after all, do not shop around for prisons. Corrections officer unions also share 
this total dependence on the government for the existence of prisons and their jobs. 
This means the structure of the industry is shaped by politics to a greater extent 
than other industries. The government can choose to incarcerate through public or private 
entities. The singular role of the government means that it should be easier to see the 
results of shifts in political activity by the introduction of private actors.  
The corrections industry is thus an ideal case for examining the effect of privatization on 
public policy, as well as comparing the political strategies of labor unions and private 
firms. 
Approaches and Data Sources 
 
 In this dissertation, I make use of several methodological approaches. I ground 
my dissertation with a formal model of the incentives that labor unions and private firms 
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face when engaging in political activity.  Empirically, I explore political activity by 
private prison firms and corrections officer union by drawing upon state and federal 
lobbying disclosure reports, as well as a series of nearly one hundred interviews across 
five states. I conducted these interviews with state legislators, lobbyists, and 
representatives of interest groups which work on criminal justice issues, between fall 
2016 and spring 2018.  
 I also study the effect of prison privatization on incarceration rates empirically. I 
make use of an original data set documenting the entry of private prisons into the United 
States in order to estimate the effect of prison privatization on incarceration through a 
time-series cross-sectional model. This model also allows me to estimate the effect of 
privatization on prison admissions per capita, as well as on correctional spending.  
 
Plan of Dissertation 
 
In Chapter 2, I review the literature on labor union organizations, discuss the 
differences between theories of union behavior, and describe how they apply to private 
and public sector labor unions. I respond to the argument presented by Volokh that prison 
privatization should reduce pro-incarceration advocacy and argue that under a variety of 
plausible assumptions, private prison firms will expend more resources on increasing the 
size of their industry, i.e., incarceration. Further, I argue under any plausible assumption, 
we should expect private prison firms to lobby more for increased incarceration than 
would a corrections officer union with the same market share.  
In Chapter 3, I discuss the differences in political spending by private prison firms 
and corrections officer unions. It shows that measured by lobbying expenditures, private 
prison firms vastly outspend corrections officer unions on the federal level as well as in a 
random sample of states.  
Chapter 4 explores whether prison privatization leads to increased incarceration. 
It demonstrates that privatizing states had almost identical incarceration rates as the 
national average before privatization, and that privatizing states experience a rapid 
increase in incarceration rates following privatization. I use a time-series cross-sectional 
model to estimate the effect of privatization on incarceration rates and find that the 
estimated effect of privatization on incarceration is roughly forty prisoners per one 
hundred thousand residents. This estimate is robust to a variety of specifications. I also 
show that this effect cannot be attributed to pre-existing state trends, crime rates, or 
political shifts. I find that the association between privatization and increased 
incarceration cannot be explained by relaxing constraints on prison capacity or by 
reducing the cost per prisoner. Chapter 4 also shows that privatization is strongly 
associated with increased correctional spending by states. 
Chapter 5 provides evidence on the different political approaches of private prison 
firms and corrections officer unions through a series of roughly one hundred interviews 
with state legislators, lobbyists, and interest group representatives. These interviews 
demonstrate that, as predicted, private prison firms have a much more proactive political 
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strategy than do corrections officer unions. They also show that the belief that private 
prison firms support increased incarceration is widely held, while the same does not hold 
for corrections officer unions. 
Chapter 6 discusses the implications of these findings for the study of criminal 
justice politics, as well as the study of interest group politics more broadly. First, private 
prison firms are powerful and proactive political actors, whose entrance into a state is 
strongly, and I argue causally, associated with increases in incarceration. More generally, 
claims that privatization of government services can yield substantial savings should be 
viewed more skeptically, as firms may more effectively lobby for increased expenditures 
on government services.  
The driving hypothesis of this dissertation is that labor unions and firms are not 
mirror images of each other, nor are their political strategies. At the same time, business 
interests and the labor movements are two of the most consequential political forces in 
U.S.  politics. Chapter 5 concludes by looking at how differences in the political 
strategies of firms and labor unions play out in politics at large.  
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Chapter Two: Different Goals of Unions and Firms 
 
 
 Volokh’s argument (2006, 2008, 2010) is simple. Incarceration is a public good 
that benefits both corrections officer unions and private prison firms. Both corrections 
officer unions and private prison firms benefit from increases in incarceration. Any 
efforts by private prison firms to increase incarceration will also benefit corrections 
officer unions and any efforts by corrections officer unions to increase incarceration will 
also benefit private prison firms. In the absence of privatization, corrections officer 
unions would receive all the benefits of increased incarceration. As private prison firms 
take market share, corrections officer unions receive less benefit from increased 
incarceration, so they reduce efforts to promote incarceration.  
Volokh points out that there is no state in the country where a majority of 
prisoners are held privately. If private and public prisons receive future prisoners in 
proportion to their current market share, this means that private prison firms will receive 
a minority of the benefit of increased incarceration. Consequently, he believes that 
corrections officer unions will reduce pro-incarceration lobbying, and in many cases 
private prison firms will not engage in pro-incarceration lobbying, preferring instead to 
free-ride off the political activity of the corrections officer unions. 
Volokh allows that there may be some cases where privatization increases pro-
incarceration advocacy, such as in states where corrections officer unions do not exist or 
are politically weak. But in general, privatization should reduce the incentive of private 
prison firms or corrections officer unions to lobby for increased incarceration. 
 Volokh is right that if firms and unions had the same goals and the same utility 
functions, they would approach politics the same way. In the case of prisons, it would 
mean that the privatization of prisons would reduce pro-incarceration advocacy by 
corrections officer unions. However, the goals of unions are distinct from the profit-
maximization of firms. While there is disagreement about the best way to describe union 
goals, the literature makes clear that unions have less reason to pursue growth than do 
private firms. 
 
What Do Unions Want? 
 
 The earliest, and still influential, approaches to modeling labor unions portrayed 
labor unions as having a monopoly on labor. First described by Dunlop (1944), unions 
were treated identically to monopolists of any other good or service. As the sole provider 
of labor to a firm, unions are able to set the price of labor, or the wage. In response, firms 
hire the number of workers that maximize profit at that wage level. The higher the wage 
set by the union, the fewer workers are hired by the firms.  Accordingly, there is a natural 
trade-off for the union between the wage level and the level of employment. Since 
Dunlop (1944) described labor as a monopoly, the basic framework of unions as labor 
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monopolist has been expanded upon and defended (Atherton, 1973; Reynolds, 1981). 
This still leaves open the question of what unions want and how to model their utility.   
  It has been common to model union utility as increasing in both wage and 
employment level (Calmfors, 1982; Cartter, 1959; Dreze & Modigliani, 1981; Farber, 
1978; Fellner, 1947; MaCurdy & Pencavel, 1986; Mcdonald & Solow, 1978; Oswald, 
1982; Sampson, 1983). In this model, the union decides what wage to demand, implicitly 
choosing the employment level. The actual wage demanded by the union depends upon 
how heavily the union weighs wages versus employment. Ross (1948) criticized this 
model, claiming that unions lacked the information necessary to project employment 
levels from wages. He claimed unions would simply try to maximize wages. However, he 
did not dispute the inverse relationship between wages and employment.  
The basic trade-off between wages and employment has also been used to model 
unions that are controlled by a representative member.  Dertouzos and Pencavel (1981) 
argued that the expected utility of a union member is the weighted average of their utility 
where union-employed workers get utility from union-set pay and others get the utility of 
non-union jobs or unemployment. The union member could increase the wage the union 
demands. If the member remained employed at a higher wage, the member would benefit 
but the non-member would be increasing his probability of being unemployed or working 
a lower-paid non-union job. McDonald and Solow (1981) presented a nearly identical 
model, with the caveat that employed workers suffer disutility from spending time at 
work. Approaches such as this assume that union members are homogenous. 
 Farber (1978) emphasized the importance of heterogeneity among union 
members, particularly in terms of seniority. He argued that when unions conduct layoffs 
by first in, first out rules, the member of median seniority will act as a swing vote and 
prevent wages from rising to the level where his or her own job may be endangered. 
Farber further argued that the entire union can be viewed as trying to maximize the utility 
of the median seniority voter because he or she holds all the power as the median voter. 
Farber (1986) also criticized other models that viewed union members as homogenous, 
particularly with respect to the size of the union, arguing that “[w]hile the level of 
employment implied by the agreement may be indistinguishable from the ex post 
membership, the ex ante membership (at the time of negotiation) is likely to be very 
different.”  Thus, models of labor unions that claim that unions gain utility from 
employment levels beyond that which would lead to full-employment among current 
union members may be very flawed. Blair and Crawford (1984, p. 557) objected to the 
extreme form of Farber’s (1986, p. 44) view where median seniority members  would 
sacrifice the jobs of all junior members to boost their own wages  because “workers at 
intermediate seniority levels presumably realize that voting for higher wage rates hastens 
the arrival of the moment when their elders vote them out of a job.” Consequently, swing 
voters in a union will not simply try to maximize their wage in a single contract period. 
Instead, union members will prefer lower wages and a higher level of employment to 
create a buffer of workers between them and lay-offs. The more risk-averse the workers 
are, the lower the wages will be. 
In step with Farber’s (1986) emphasis on incumbent union members, more recent 
scholars have shifted away from the view that unions gain utility from increased 
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employment. Instead they have emphasized that there is no reason for unions to value 
increasing employment once they succeed in providing jobs for all their members.  
Carruth and Oswald (1987, p. 441) argued that as  “long as one is willing to make the 
usual assumption that individual workers are rational and selfish, and to hold the 
assumptions that union leaders represent their members and that future union members 
have no voting rights”, there will presumably be an employment level (equal to voting 
membership)” where utility curves are ‘kinked’ representing the fact that further 
increases in employment provide no benefit to the union. While they allow that actual 
union members might display some form of altruism to outsider workers, they argued that 
“few economists would want to take an axiom of unselfishness as the foundation stone 
upon which to construct a theory of trade union actions.” Lindbeck and Snower (2002, p. 
28) showed  that this kinked utility curve implies that in cases of economic upturns 
unions will push for increased demand to be met by wage increases not employment 
increases, “but in a downturn (when employment often falls short of membership), the 
union will accept a combination of wage and employment cuts.” 
Similar reasoning was used to argue that unions will only accept lower wages in 
exchange for increased employment, when the median voter feels at risk of layoffs 
(Kaufman and Martinez-Vazquez, 1987). The same authors (1988) examined the UAW 
vote on ratifying a 1982 contract with General Motors. Consistent with their theory, this 
contract that included concessions from workers won the greatest support in bargaining 
units where workers believed high wages posed a layoff threat to their unit. 
The level of employment is sometimes equal to the level of union membership 
such as when unemployed workers are not union members and the workplace is a closed 
shop, so all workers have to maintain membership in order to work. However, most of the 
time the level of employment is not equal to the level of union membership.  ,  If  all new 
employees join the union they would put downward pressure on wages and change the 
preferences of the union or median union voters  in the direction of lower wages and 
more employment because  the new hires will want to protect their own jobs. Chaison 
(1986) argued that there were economies of scale in operating a union such as funding a 
strike fund or hiring full-time staffers. If so, this would imply that unions should gain 
value from increased membership even if they do not value it for its own sake. Whatever 
the advantages of increased union density or increased membership size, they do not 
erase the fundamental trade-off between pay and employment. 
 
Are Public Sector Unions Different? 
 
 Differences between public sector and private sector unions have not drawn 
substantial attention in the literature. Freeman (1984) did discuss the differences between 
private and public sector unions, arguing that in the public sector, unions could pressure 
government to increase their consumption of a good or service, whereas private sector 
unions could not lobby manufacturers beyond what they thought was profitable. He 
described public sector unions as increasing the overall demand or shifting the demand 
curve to the right, which would allow public sector unions to simultaneously increase 
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employment and wages.  Even if this is true, once public sector unions have increased 
demand as far as they can (or want), any negotiation over wages should still display the 
same trade-off between employment and pay.  
 While Freeman stands out by directly discussing how to adapt standard views of 
union activities for the public sector, others have discussed how the strategies of public 
sector unions differ from private ones, generally by emphasizing the greater role politics 
play. Dalton (1982) argued that the key difference between public and private sector 
unions is that governments can choose to not engage in collective bargaining so public 
sector unions have to pursue a greater density of unionization to make up for its legal 
weakness. Summers (1974) argued that unlike in the private sector where wages were set 
between union and employer, in the public sector, setting wages and employment also 
involves other political actors. For instance, teacher pay depends not only on the actions 
of the labor union and their own leverage, but also on the actions of teachers as a whole. 
Summers argued that this is often advantageous for public sector unions as they can gain 
allies. Looking at education, he argued that parents are happy to support higher pay for 
teachers because parents will only pay a portion of the increased taxes that will fund a 
service, they believe benefits them. Other scholars have also explored the role that 
political leverage plays in determining pay for public employees. Anzia (2011) showed 
that higher teacher pay resulted from school board election timing that led to low voter 
turnout and favored organized interests. Moe (2011) argued that teacher unions face the 
same trade-off as other unions-- the conflict between higher numbers of teachers 
employed and higher teacher compensation. 
 These differences between public and private sector unions, while important, do 
not free public sector unions from the trade-off between employment and wages. This 
trade-off may be less acute because public sector unions can engage in advocacy to 
increase demand for the services they provide. However, public sector unions still face 
disincentives to growth in ways that firms do not. Therefore, it follows that corrections 
officer unions have less reason to seek increased incarceration than do private prison 
firms. 
 
CEOS and Union Leaders  
 
 So far, I have argued that the divergent interests of shareholders and incumbent 
union members should lead to differences in political behavior between corrections 
officer unions and private prison firms. Yet what if the typical union member or the 
typical shareholder is not the one to determine the political behavior of their 
organizations? What if it is the motives of business executives and union leaders that 
determine the political behavior of their organizations? In this case, we should still expect 
to see firms value growth more as union leaders benefit less from growth than do 
corporate executives, and face constraints to pursuing growth through democratic control 
of the union by union members. 
 Hallock and Klein (2011) showed that the compensation of labor union executives 
is correlated with both the pay of their union members and the size of the labor union. 
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This means that union leaders do gain financial rewards from increasing the size of their 
union, and that the salary of union leaders is roughly as elastic as the salary of CEOs 
when their organization grows in terms of members and employees, respectively. But, 
given the higher average salary of corporate leaders, the gain in dollars is much higher for 
CEOs who manage to grow the size of their firms than for union leaders. In addition, 
union leaders have to maintain the support of union membership in order to preserve their 
positions, which constrains their ability to pursue membership growth. 
  Dertouzos and Pencavel (1981) argued that union leaders would want to grow union 
membership to a level that was greater than optimal for union members. They argued that 
union leaders gain political power and prestige by running a large union. Union members 
in contrast, face increasing competition because a static number of unionized jobs or 
wages must be cut to induce employers to increase overall levels of employment. 
However, even union leaders appear to put more emphasis on compensation than on 
employment levels. This model provides a reason why union members may not only 
oppose growth in employment levels but might oppose growth in union membership as 
well. 
A survey of union leaders in the United Kingdom (Clark and Oswald, 1993) 
found that 90% tried to bargain over compensation; only a quarter tried to negotiate with 
employers over total employment level. This could be a function of union leaders’ own 
interests or could be a reflection of democratic constraint by union members.  
 Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) proposed a model where union leaders had the 
twin goals of preserving the existence of their union and maintaining their own position 
as union leaders.  Although this meant that union leaders had interests relatively aligned 
with the members who elected them, Ashenfelter and Johnson argued that in some cases 
union leaders would take unnecessarily antagonistic strike actions towards employers to 
demonstrate solidarity with the union members who feared overly accommodationist 
leaders. Atherton (1973) also viewed union leaders as relatively constrained by union 
members who are able to evaluate union leader performance by the quality of their 
contract and can thus effectively monitor leaders. 
Regardless of what union leaders might prefer, the actual behavior of unions suggests that 
unions are motivated to prioritize the interests of their current members. Freeman and 
Kleiner (1990) found that the unionization of new firms led to large changes in seniority 
protections and grievance procedures, and smaller changes to pay. Studies that looked at 
worker motivation to join unions also shows that prospective union members are focused 
on their own pay and workplace protections, not a general support for the union 
movement or support for a high employment level.  Access to union grievance 
procedures (Seidman, London, & Karsh, 1951), job security (Farber & Saks, 1980) and 
bread-and butter issues like compensation and benefits (Strauss & Gallagher, 1991) are 
among the most important motives to join labor unions, with political goals ranking low 
among reasons given as to why workers join unions (Strauss & Gallagher, 1991). 
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Institutional Differences and Pro-Incarceration Advocacy  
 
 If corrections officer unions do not value growth at all, corrections officer unions 
would be unlikely to engage in pro-incarceration advocacy. This means that private 
prison firms cannot free-ride off of unions’ non-existent pro-incarceration advocacy. 
Because private prison firms almost certainly benefit from increased incarceration, prison 
privatization would increase pro-incarceration advocacy. Though it may seem extreme to 
suggest that corrections officer unions do not engage in pro-incarceration advocacy, I 
present evidence that this may generally be the case in Chapter Five.  
 What if differences between corrections officer unions and private prison firms 
are more modest? This could be the case where private prison firms value growth more 
than corrections officer unions, but unions still benefit from increased incarceration. 
Would privatization reduce or increase pro-incarceration advocacy? Here, the answer 
depends upon how much more private prison firms value increases in incarceration as 
well as the relative market share of the public and private sector prisons. 
 To simplify, I assume, as Volokh did, that future prisoners are divided in 
proportion to current market share. If three quarters of prisoners are held in unionized 
public prisons, and one quarter in a prison operated by a single private prison firm, then 
that is the proportion of market share, respectively. This means for a private prison firm 
to benefit more from increased incarceration than does the corrections officer union, it 
would have to value receiving an additional prisoner more than three times as much as 
the corrections officer union does.  
 More generally, for private prison firms to benefit more than corrections officer 
unions from an increase in incarceration, the ratio of the marginal value of prisoners for 
private prisons compared  to the marginal value of prisoners for corrections officer 
unions must be higher than the ratio of public sector market share to private sector market 
share. The value per prisoner received by private prisons must be great enough to offset 
its smaller market share. When this occurs, private prison firms have a stronger incentive 
to engage in pro-incarceration advocacy than do corrections officer unions and it is 
possible that the new advocacy by private prisons will outweigh any decline in advocacy 
by corrections officer unions. If private prison firms do not value marginal prisoners 
highly enough to offset their smaller market share, the collective action problem caused 
by the division of prisoners between public and private prisons should reduce pro-
incarceration advocacy as predicted by Volokh.  
 At any level of market share, private prison firms should be more likely to engage 
in pro-incarceration advocacy than would a corrections officer union with that same 
market share. In practice, corrections officer unions always have greater market share 
than do private prison firms, except in the minority of states where corrections officers 
are not unionized.   
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Behavior During Retrenchment 
 
Corrections officer unions have weaker incentives to support increased 
incarceration than do private prison firms. But what happens if increases in incarceration 
are off the table? What if a wave of criminal justice reformers is elected and threaten to 
shut down or dramatically reduce incarceration? Who has a stronger incentive to fight 
against a reduction of the incarceration rate? The answer depends on the size of the 
decline in incarceration. 
If a proposed reform would only slightly cut the incarceration rate, it is possible 
that it would not harm current union members. There is a natural attrition of current union 
members due to retirement of corrections officer unions. If reductions in employment of 
corrections officers is slight enough to be met only through attrition, corrections officer 
unions may have little reason to fight against reductions in incarceration. This is not true 
for private prison firms, or their shareholders, who would be harmed by even small cuts 
to the number of prisoners they hold. 
For larger cuts in incarceration, both interest groups would have reason to oppose 
such reforms. It is true that both corrections officer unions and private prison firms could 
seek to maintain the benefits they retain from incarceration even as the incarceration rate 
falls. If prisons are under-staffed, perhaps reductions in incarceration could result in more 
appropriate levels of staffing per prisoner rather than layoffs. Or unions might be able to 
featherbed and use their influence to persuade governments to hire an excessive number 
of workers. Private prison firms could seek to renegotiate contracts to either receive 
higher pay per prisoner housed or get contracts with guarantees that their prisons will 
hold (or be paid to hold) a set number of prisoners. Yet if reductions in incarceration are 
substantial enough, such concessions by governments to corrections officer unions or 
private prison firms may not be sustainable in the long run. 
Therefore, both corrections officer unions and private prison firms are likely to 
oppose substantial reductions in incarceration. This means that in the future, the political 
effect of privatization on incarceration may be muted because the United States 
incarceration rate peaked in 2007.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 Unions and firms are different. They have different structures and different goals. 
This means that private prison firms benefit more from growth than do corrections officer 
unions. At the same time, in no state do private prisoners hold a majority of prisoners. 
Given the minority market share that private prison firms hold, do they find it worthwhile 
to engage in pro-incarceration advocacy? Do they support increases in incarceration more 
than corrections officer unions? In the next three chapters, I address this issue.  
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Chapter 3: Political Expenditures 
 
  Who cares more about shaping criminal justice policy and increasing 
incarceration-private prison firms or corrections officer unions? Or at the very least 
which type of interest group spends more on influencing politics? In this chapter, I show 
that private prisons firms invest more in political spending than do corrections officer 
unions, at both the state and federal level.  
Should overall spending on politics by private prison firms be higher than overall 
political spending by corrections officer unions? Here it is less clear. If two groups were 
identical, except the second group had more political issues it cared about, the second 
group would likely spend more on politics. Unions and firms are not identical as I have 
argued. They have separate goals, different political allies, and have access to different 
political resources. While I expect private prison firms to spend more on influencing 
incarceration, I do not believe my theory on the difference between the political strategies 
of firms and unions makes clear predictions about aggregate political expenditures. In 
this chapter I demonstrate that private prison firms make substantially higher 
incarceration-related political expenditures than do corrections officer unions.\ 
 
Political Expenditures of Private Prison Firms and Corrections Officer Unions 
 
 I begin my comparison of private prisons firms and corrections officer unions at 
the federal level. Groups and individuals that lobby the federal government are required 
by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 and the Honest Leadership and Open 
Government Act of 2007 to disclose sources of lobbying incomes and the federal 
agencies they lobby. Importantly, lobbyists are also required to disclose the issues on 
which they are lobbying. Issues are reported in broad government-provided categories 
such as law enforcement/crime/criminal justice, immigration, and railroads. Lobbyists 
also must provide more detailed descriptions regarding the focus of their activities such 
as specific statutes or regulatory decisions when they complete their lobbying disclosure 
forms.  
The Council of Prisons Locals C-33 represents employees of the Bureau of 
Prisons. It is part of the American Federation of Government Employees, and through the 
AFGE part of the AFL-CIO, so I also include spending by the AFGE or the AFL-CIO. 
The firms that operate correctional facilities include the Corrections Corporation of 
America, GEO Group, the Management and Training Corporation, Avalon Correctional 
Services, Correctional Services, LCS Correction Services, Community Education 
Centers, Amazon Correctional Services, Emerald Correctional, and LaSalle Corrections. 
There are other private companies that operate in prisons such as those that provide food 
or medical services. Because they do not operate entire prisons, I excluded them. These 
excluded firms include Wexford, Aramark, and Corizon. 
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 I rely on these lobbying disclosure forms to measure aggregate expenditures of 
private prison firms and corrections officer unions, and also what share of their lobbying 
expenditures is related to incarceration. Determining to what extent lobbying 
expenditures should be attributed to incarceration-related lobbying is a difficult 
challenge.  Private prison firms could lobby on issues that are not directly or indirectly 
related to incarceration. The GEO Group, one of the nation’s largest private prison 
operators, is structured as a real estate investment trust (REIT) for instance. Some of its 
lobbying may be on tax treatment of REITS. The AFL-CIO lobbies on behalf of millions 
of workers; it would be absurd to claim every dollar spent by the AFL-CIO is related to 
incarceration, even with very broad definitions of “related to incarceration.”  
 To address this challenge, I excluded every lobbying report that did not report a 
connection to incarceration. I took a broad view of what counted as related. A report was 
included as related if it described  lobbying on the general issue area of law enforcement, 
crime, criminal justice; listed  lobbying agencies such as the Bureau of Prisons, the Office 
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, or the Parole Commission; or if it  listed 
an issue related to prisons, incarceration or criminal justice. I examined reports between 
2000 and 2014. 
 Most lobbying disclosure reports contain evidence of lobbying on multiple 
issue areas.  Therefore, I divided the total amount of expenditures reported by the number 
of general issue areas on which respondents reported lobbying to find the measure of 
expenditures on prisons/incarceration. The assumption of uniform distribution of reported 
lobbying expenditures has been previously used to measure expenditures per lobbyist 
(Bertrand, Bombardini and Trebbi, 2011). I make a similar assumption, that each issue 
area takes an equal share of lobbying expenditures. By this measure, in every year from 
2001 to 2014, corporate expenditures have exceeded labor expenditures on lobbying. I 
report this data below. Figure 3.1 shows the lobbying expenditures by corrections officer 
unions (including parent unions) and private prisons firms attributed to incarceration-
related lobbying. Figure 3.2 shows the same expenditures divided by the number of 
federal prisoners held in public or private prisons, respectively. 
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Figure 3.1 
Estimated Incarceration-Related Lobbying Expenditures (in thousands) 
 
 
Figure 3.2 
Estimated Incarceration-Related Lobbying Expenditures Per Prisoner (in 
thousands) 
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 The differences are enormous in both absolute terms and per prisoner terms. On a 
per prisoner basis, private prison firms outspent corrections officer unions by an order of 
magnitude every year. It is possible that some of the federal lobbying expenditures from 
private prison firms were related to their facilities that hold state prisoners. For example, 
the Department of Justice grant programs may affect states’ corrections departments and 
indirectly affect private prison firms’ state-level operations. Roughly a quarter of 
privately held prisoners are under the jurisdiction of the federal government, thus 
assuming only a quarter of federal lobbying expenditures are related to the federal 
criminal justice system, private firms would still vastly outspend unions by this per 
prisoner measure. 
 Additional evidence that private prison firms lobby more on incarceration 
than do corrections officer unions comes not from total expenditures but from the 
agencies that each type of interest group chooses to lobby. I reviewed the same lobbying 
reports which I used to calculate incarceration-attributed lobbying expenditures, to 
compare how often federal agencies that are connected to incarceration were lobbied by 
private prison firms or corrections officer unions.  These agencies are the Department of 
Justice, the Bureau of Prisons, the DEA, the FBI, the National Institute of Corrections, 
the National Institute of Justice, the Office of the National Drug Control Policy, and the 
Parole Commission.  Of these agencies, lobbying disclosure reports for 2001 to 2014 
listed only the DOJ and the Bureau of Prisons.  
 The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (effective in 2008) 
amended the reporting requirement from biannual to quarterly reports, which explains the 
sudden increase in the number of reported contacts with the named agencies. 
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Table 3.1 
Number of Reports with Contact with Named Agency 
 Corporate 
Contacts DOJ 
Labor Contacts 
DOJ 
Corporate 
Contacts BOP 
Labor Contacts 
BOP 
2001 1 2 0 0 
2002 2 3 0 0 
2003 3 1 1 0 
2004 4 1 2 0 
2005 7 2 3 0 
2006 7 0 5 0 
2007 4 0 3 0 
2008 13 0 5 0 
2009 9 0 3 0 
2010 8 0 3 0 
2011 5 0 1 0 
2012 4 0 0 0 
2013 3 2 0 0 
2014 1 3 0 0 
 
 Private firms contacted the Department of Justice in every year from 2001 to 
2013, and only lagged behind Labor in the number of contacts in three years. In over half 
the years, labor unions did not contact the Department of Justice at all.  Only private 
firms contacted the Bureau of Prisons. To see if this is simply the result of firms 
spreading their lobbying between more federal agencies, I calculated the average number 
of agencies or other government institutions contacted per report. I tabulated this by 
summing the number of federal institutions listed as being contacted under every 
lobbying issue area. There are 239 private prison firm reports with attributed spending, 
with an average of 8.77 contacts per report.  There are 60 labor union reports with an 
average of 67.75 contacts per report. Labor unions were very active in lobbying federal 
agencies; however, unions did not lobby those agencies most directly involved with 
incarceration. 
Lobbying Expenditures on Immigration 
 A similar dynamic between unions and private prison firms can arguably be seen 
when it comes to immigration. In the United States, immigrants are detained in federally 
operated detention centers, privately operated detention centers, and state and local jails 
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and prisons. Many of the firms that provide private prison services also run immigrant 
detention centers. In November of 2017, 71% of all detained immigrants were in the 
custody of private prison firms. (Cullen, 2018). 
I compare lobbying expenditures between private prisons and two unions, the 
National ICE Council and the National Border Patrol Council. They are part of the 
American Federation of Government Employees, and through AFGE part of the AFL-
CIO. Drawing on the same source of lobbying records as before, I calculated the share of 
lobbying expenditures that are attributed to immigration-related lobbying by assuming 
uniform distribution of lobbying expenditures across issue areas. 
 
Figure 3.3 
Estimated Immigration-Related Lobbying Expenditures (in thousands) 
 
Despite not lobbying on immigration until 2003, the private firms outspent the 
labor unions every year thereafter. This is remarkable. The AFL-CIO has many reasons 
to lobby on immigration, such as guest worker programs, that are not connected to 
immigrant detention. Despite this, labor unions spend relatively little on immigration 
related lobbying.  
The differences between the immigrant detention system and the prison system 
are substantial in themselves. Further, private prisons have a larger market share within 
immigrant detention than they do they in federal prisons. Still, the pattern of greater 
political spending by private prisons is consistent with my theory that private prison firms 
are more inclined to support increased incarceration. 
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Federal Campaign Contributions 
Beyond lobbying, political expenditures can come in the form of campaign 
contributions. I collected data on campaign contributions from private prisons and 
corrections officer unions from followthemoney.org. These contributions represent 
contributions from firms, unions, affiliated PACS, and employees of private prison firms 
and corrections officer unions. Attributing campaign contributions to incarceration-
related concerns is even more challenging than it is with lobbying expenditures because 
donors do not report which issues motivate their giving.  I assume that donations are 
motivated by the same issues as lobbying and that the share of lobbying expenditures 
related to incarceration is equal to the share of federal campaign contributions related to 
incarceration. 
Figure 3.4 
Estimated Incarceration-Related Federal Campaign Contributions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 
Estimated Incarceration-Related Federal Campaign Contributions Per Prisoner 
 
 
 
In most of these years, private prison firms spent dramatically more per prisoner than 
corrections officer unions. In 2013, the year in which private prison firms spent the least, 
labor unions edge them out by four cents per prisoner.  While private prison firms 
generally outspent the unions in absolute and per prisoner terms in the majority of years, 
by this measure, the differences are not as stark as they are in terms of lobbying 
expenditures 
 
State-Level Political Expenditures 
 
Private prison firms also spent more heavily on lobbying at the state level. I 
randomly selected ten states that reported any privately held prisoners between 2000 and 
2014. This data was taken from the Bureau of Justice Statistic’s National Prisoner Series.  
I then obtained lobbying expenditure records for labor unions and prison firms from their 
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electronically available lobbying records. I recorded data for both labor unions that 
directly represented corrections officers and the larger unions that are affiliated with 
corrections officers. Where no records were directly available (three states), I wrote to the 
state agencies responsible for maintaining lobbying records and requested data on 
lobbying expenditures.  
States recorded lobbying expenditures differently. When expenditures were 
reported as a range, as happened in Florida, I use the midpoint of the reported range. 
North Dakota maintains records of lobbyists and their clients, but expenditure amounts 
are not available.  Not all states had lobbying expenditure records available for all years. 
For Indiana, which ended collective bargaining by public employees partway through the 
period, I calculated the per prisoner-year spending by unions only during the period in 
which its corrections officer union was active. 
Unlike federal lobbying disclosures, not all states require lobbyists to disclose the 
issues that are the subject of their lobbying. Therefore, the following comparisons are 
between all lobbying expenditures by unions that represent corrections officers and by 
private prisons. I make no attempt to attribute lobbying to specific issue areas.  This 
means that states where corrections officer unions are represented by multiple unions will 
have higher total lobbying expenditures, despite not necessarily indicating that these 
states have unions which lobby more on incarceration, specifically.   Nonetheless, private 
prisons still generally spent far more on lobbying.  
Figure 3.6 
Lobbying Expenditures Per Prisoner-Year 
 
 In the majority of states, private prison firms spent more per prisoner-year than 
did corrections officer unions.  In Colorado, Florida, Indiana, and Kentucky, private 
010
2030
4050
6070
8090
Connecticut Colorado Florida Indiana Kentucky Maryland New JerseyPrivate Prisons CO Unions
24  
prisons spent an order of magnitude more per prisoner-year. In Connecticut, private 
prisons spent roughly 50% more per prisoner-year. 
 The exceptions to this general pattern are worth examining in detail.  In New 
Jersey, labor outspent the private firms per prisoner. However, in New Jersey corrections 
officers were represented by several unions, such as the New Jersey Superior Officers 
Association, the New Jersey State Policemen’s Benevolent Association, and AFSCME 
Council 71. Since each of these unions has some lobbying that almost certainly is not 
related to incarceration, the division between multiple unions boosts the reported 
spending beyond what it would be if all corrections officers were represented by a single 
union.  
In Maryland private prison firms spent no money lobbying.  All private prisons 
were operated by nonprofits in both years in which correctional facility censuses were 
conducted. The incentives that drive private firms to grow are much weaker for 
nonprofits. Nonprofit executives do not get stock options nor do the board members of 
nonprofits have the right to retain earnings for their own benefit. Thus, the absence of 
private prison lobbying in Maryland is not inconsistent with my theory. 
 In South Dakota and Alabama, there were no reported lobbying expenditures by 
either interest group. State lobbying disclosure laws in some states have much narrower 
requirements for what type of spending must be disclosed and narrower definitions of 
lobbying which may explain the absence of reported expenditures. 
Overall, private prison firms spent far more on lobbying that is plausibly related 
to incarceration than would be expected by their market share alone. The same pattern 
repeats at the state-level regarding lobbying related to immigration, and albeit to a lesser 
extent, federal campaign contributions. Private prison firms spent far more on politics 
than corrections officer unions. These stark differences in spending also suggest that if 
corrections officer unions wished to increase incarceration, they might be less capable 
than private firms. 
However, much political activity is not captured by these quantitative measures. 
Labor unions can mobilize their members to vote or engage in other forms of political 
activity. Firms can donate to think tanks that advance their ideological goals.  Financial 
expenditures also do not capture possible differences in political sophistication between 
corrections officer unions and private prison firms. Perhaps most importantly, measures 
of financial expenditures cannot show the full extent to which either interest group 
lobbies on criminal justice policies or supports pro-incarceration public policy. In 
Chapter Five, I address these limitations, by turning to a series of interviews with those 
who have direct knowledge of criminal justice politics: state legislators serving on 
committees related to criminal justice and representatives of interest groups which lobby 
on criminal justice issues at the state level. 
That said, the sheer magnitude of the differences in political spending by these 
two interest groups reveals that these groups approach politics in different ways and 
suggests the possibility that private prison firms seek to increase incarceration in ways 
that corrections officer unions do not. 
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Chapter 4: Privatization and Incarceration 
 Does prison privatization increase incarceration? This claim has plagued private 
prison firms since the beginning of their operations. Despite their repeated protestations, 
this belief is still widely held. Given the incentives of firms to expand their business and 
maximize profit, it seems reasonable that private prison firms would seek to increase 
incarceration. In this chapter I examine the core claim of this dissertation, that prison 
privatization increases incarceration. 
There are many ways private prison firms could work to increase incarceration. 
They could support tough-on-crime policies such as truth-in-sentencing laws or three 
strikes laws. They could support friendly candidates in judicial, legislative, gubernatorial, 
and prosecutorial elections. They could try to block alternatives to incarceration such as 
increased reliance on probation and parole. My theory is agnostic to the particular form 
of pro-incarceration tactics that private prison firms may pursue. It is likely that which 
tactic they pursue would likely vary across time and across states. 
 I look at the question directly. Do states that adopt the use of for-profit private 
prisons experience higher rates of incarceration than would otherwise be expected? And 
if so, are there explanations other than political advocacy by private prison firms that can 
plausibly explain higher incarceration rates? 
In this chapter I argue that prison privatization is strongly associated with 
increased incarceration, and that this relationship is causal. I first show that states that use 
private prisons have incarceration trends that diverge from the national average 
incarceration rate following privatization. I then exploit the staggered introduction of 
private prisons to estimate the effect of privatization on incarceration rates using a time-
series cross-sectional model. I find that the effect of privatization on incarceration is large 
and statistically significant.  I show that this finding is robust to a variety of model 
specifications and that the timing of these effects is consistent with advocacy-driven 
increases in incarceration. I also show that other explanations for the relationship 
between privatization and higher rates of incarceration do not match the observed data. 
The estimated effect of prison privatization depends on model specification, ranging from 
30 to 53 prisoners per 100,000 residents. This suggests that states with private prisons, 
using the most conservative estimates, had incarceration rates in 2014 that were 7% to 
13.5% higher than they would have had without private prisons. I also explore the fiscal 
impact of prison privatization and show that privatizing states do not achieve any savings 
per prisoner, and given the increase in incarceration following privatization, privatizing 
states end up spending more per resident on corrections. 
 
Timeline of Prison Privatization 
 
A challenge to estimating the effect of prison privatization was the absence of a 
comprehensive timeline of the year of adoption of for-profit private prisons. Beginning in 
1999, the Bureau of Justice Statistics provides the numbers of prisoners by state held in 
private prisons per state. However, the Bureau of Justice Statistics does not differentiate 
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between for-profit and non-profit private facilities. Likewise, Blumstein, Cohen and Seth 
(2007) provided a record of which states used private prisons beginning in 1996, based 
on the Corrections Yearbook. Like the Bureau of Justice Statistics, Blumstein et al. did 
not distinguish between for-profit and non-profit prisons. 
 In order to create a data set that included whether states used for-profit private 
prison and the year of their adoption, I drew on a variety of sources, including articles, 
court proceedings, correctional department websites, private prison websites, and 
newspaper accounts. Sources for each date of privatization is available in the appendix. 
 I treated a state as having adopted private prisons if adult prisoners under state 
jurisdiction were placed into a correctional facility operated by a for-profit private firm. 
These facilities could include private prisons of any security level, or halfway houses. In 
most cases, privatizing states used privately operated prisons that held the general adult 
population. Michigan’s use of private prisons came in the form of a “punk prison” that 
primarily housed juvenile offenders, but also 19-year old adults. In New Jersey, the state 
contracted with a nonprofit to operate halfway houses, and the nonprofit contracted with 
a for-profit operator.  When states had only county or local jails that were privately 
operated, I coded them as un-treated, unless these jails also housed convicted state 
prisoners as was the case in Tennessee.  
 Adoption of private prisons began in the 1980s and grew slowly through the rest 
of the decade. In 1990, eight states made use of for-profit prisons but by 1999, over half 
of all states used for-profit prisons. In the 2000s, several states abandoned the use of for-
profit prisons, but they remained in use for about half the states through 2014. Table 4.1 
presents the use of for-profit private prisons by state through 2014. 
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Table 4.1 
 
Use of For-Profit Private Prisons by State 
 
State Year Adopted 
Alabama 2003 
Alaska 1985 
Arizona 1994 
Arkansas 1998-2002 
California 1986 
Colorado 1995 
Connecticut Did not Privatize 
Delaware Did not Privatize 
Florida 1985 
Georgia 1998 
Hawaii 1995 
Idaho 1997 
Illinois Did not Privatize 
Indiana 1998 
Iowa Did not Privatize 
Kansas Did not Privatize 
Kentucky 1986-2013 
Louisiana 1990 
Maine Did not Privatize 
Maryland Did not Privatize 
Massachusetts Did not Privatize 
Michigan 1998-2005 
Minnesota 2004-2010 
Mississippi 1996 
Missouri Did not Privatize 
Montana 1999 
Nebraska Did not Privatize 
Nevada 1997-2003 
New Hampshire Did not Privatize 
New Jersey 1996 
New Mexico 1989 
New York Did not Privatize 
North Carolina 1998-2001 
North Dakota 2004-2010 
Ohio 2000 
Oklahoma 1996 
Oregon Did not Privatize 
Pennsylvania 2001 
Rhode Island Did not Privatize 
South Carolina Did not Privatize 
South Dakota 1992 
Tennessee 1984 
Texas 1984 
Utah 1994-2001 
Vermont 2004 
Virginia 1998 
Washington 2004-2010 
West Virginia Did not Privatize 
Wisconsin 1998-2005 
Wyoming 1997 
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Incarceration Rates Before and After Privatization 
 
States were not forced to adopt the use of for-profit private prisons. That some 
did, and others did not, suggests that there are likely differences between the two types of 
states. It would not be surprising if the two sets of states had very different average 
incarceration rates. States that privatized had slightly higher incarceration rate as all 
states.  Yet, a few years after states adopted the use of private prisons, trends diverged, 
with incarceration rates in privatized states growing more rapidly. For instance, 
Mississippi’s incarceration rate before and after privatization is shown in Figure 4.1, as is 
the 50-state average incarceration rate over that time. The incarceration rate refers to the 
number of prisoners under state jurisdiction per one hundred thousand residents. In 
Figure 4.2, I present the average incarceration rate for states that privatized in the decade 
immediately prior to privatization, and the decade that begins upon privatization. To 
compare states that privatized to the nation as whole, I compare each state that privatized 
to the average incarceration rate across the same time period for all 50 states. 
Figure 4.1 
 
Incarceration Rate in Mississippi Before and After Privatization 
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Figure 4.2 
 
Incarceration Rates, Before and After Privatization 
 
Figure 4.2 demonstrates that in the years prior to privatization, states that privatized had 
incarceration rates that were rising at roughly the same rate as the nation as a whole. Yet 
in the period following privatization, states that privatized experienced faster growth in 
their incarceration while states as a whole experienced slower growth in incarceration 
rates. This difference can be seen by comparing the difference in incarceration rates 
between privatizing states and all states, as shown in Figure 4.3. The slope of the relative 
incarceration rate doubles in the decade after privatization. 
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Figure 4.3 
 
Relative Incarceration Rate of Privatizing-States 
 
  
States diverged from national trends in incarceration rates following privatization. 
This is consistent with my hypothesis that privatization causes increased incarceration.  
Alternatively, increased incarceration could cause privatization. Perhaps states adopted 
the use of private prisons to address swelling prison populations. Or private prison firms 
might prefer to enter states where incarceration is growing the most rapidly. Yet, looking 
at the data, these possibilities of reverse causality seem extremely unlikely. These trends 
are consistent with my hypothesis that privatization is driving increased incarceration. 
 
Time-series Cross-sectional Model 
 
 To estimate the effect of privatization, I use a time-series cross-sectional model. 
My data set includes all 50 states and all years between 1978 and 2014, inclusive. I use 
state fixed effects to control for time-invariant features of states. Because contemporary 
use of for-profit private prisons began in the 1980s, the use of private prisons is not time-
invariant for any state. 
 I use two different approaches to control for the effects of time on incarceration. 
In some specifications, I use year fixed effects. Year fixed effects allow me to control for 
year-to-year shocks to incarceration rates. I implement year fixed effects through the use 
of a dummy variable for each year in my panel. The limitation to the use of year fixed 
effects is that individual state incarceration rates may follow their own path over time.  
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Failing to control for this could lead to a spurious relationship between prison 
privatization and incarceration rates. If states privatized their prisons in response to a 
growing prison population, then states would experience faster growth in incarceration 
before they privatized. Thus, there could be a positive and significant relationship 
between prison privatization and incarceration rates despite the causal relationship being 
reversed. While this appears to be untrue based on the figures that show relative 
incarceration rates, I can also explicitly control for this through the use of state-specific 
time trends. 
 To control for different trends in incarceration rates between states, I created a 
linear variable for a national time trend. In my equation, I incorporate both the national 
time trend and an interaction between it and each state. This allows me to estimate the 
effect of prison privatization on incarceration rates by controlling for state-specific time 
trends, as well as the national time trend. 
 I use a dummy variable for prison privatization. A state is coded as treated in 
years in which a for-profit private correctional facility housed prisoners under state 
jurisdiction, and as un-treated otherwise. Initially, I was concerned that private prison 
firms might have begun to lobby on incarceration before they actually housed any 
prisoners. A firm could have begun pro-incarceration advocacy upon signing a contract 
with a state or when a state passed legislation or implemented an administrative decision 
that allowed for the use of private prisons. If this were the case, there might be an 
apparent treatment effect in the years immediately before prison privatization. This is not 
the case as I will discuss in more detail later. 
 I also use a dummy variable to indicate when a state has discontinued the use of 
for-profit private prisons. This is because the effect of no longer having private prisons 
may be different than the effect of never having had private prisons. For instance, 
incarceration might fall rapidly without the support of private prison firms. 
 A risk of using panel data for time-series cross-section models is that serially 
correlated errors may cause an underestimation of the standard error. Consequently, the 
certainty of findings may be overstated, because p-values may be inappropriately small. I 
adjust for this by using the coeftest package in R which allows me to adjust for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (Croissant and Milo, 2008). Standard errors are 
clustered by state. 
 I compiled the dates of prison privatization by state. Data on prisoners and 
incarceration rates by state were obtained from the Bureau of Justice Statistics.   
Table 4.2 shows the results of the linear regression of prisoners per capita on state 
fixed effects, prison privatization, and either year fixed effects or national and state-
specific time trends. 
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Table 4.2 
 
Effect of Privatization on Incarceration Per Capita 
 Year Fixed Effects Time Trends 
Privatization    53.71*** 
(15.05) 
 
  38.51*** 
(11.17) 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.79 0.87 
Observations 1850 1850 
*p < .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Both specifications show a large and highly significant effect of privatization on 
incarceration rates. I believe modeling the effects of time as state-specific trends is more 
sensible than assuming national shocks. 
 
Incorporating Controls 
 
 To test the robustness of my model, I introduce a set of controls to my time-series 
cross-sectional model. These controls consist of state policy liberalism, crime rates, 
partisan control of government, and state demographics.  
 A possible explanation for the apparent effects of prison privatization on 
incarceration rates is that states may have undergone a political shift to the right that 
caused states to be more sympathetic to the use of private firms to deliver government 
services as well as to increased incarceration. I use the measures of state policy liberalism 
calculated by Warshaw and Caughey (2015). The authors calculated a measure of state 
policy liberalism for every state that extends across the length of my panel data. I include 
covariates from Warshaw and Caughey (2015) for their estimated upper and lower 
bounds for state policy liberalism, as well as the median of their estimates for each state.  
 Political control of state government is controlled using dummy variables which 
indicate whether a state has a Democratic governor, a Republican governor, a Republican 
or Democratic lower chamber majority, and a Republican or Democratic upper chamber 
majority. Partisan control data was taken from Klarner (2013) in years before 2012, and 
from the National Conference of State Legislatures for 2012-2014 (2019). 
I also control for violent crimes and property crimes reported per capita. Reported 
crimes are taken from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting. Changes in crime rates could 
influence state incarceration rates so including covariates for crime rates could improve 
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the statistical model.  There is a risk of including covariates for crime rates if the 
mechanism by which private firms increased incarceration also increased measured crime 
rates, perhaps by increasing the number of activities which are criminal or enforcement of 
laws; then covariates for crime rates could soak up the effect that privatization had on 
incarceration rates. This would lead to an under-estimation of the effect of prison 
privatization. However, it’s also possible that shifts in the crime rate could affect both the 
propensity to privatize and the incarceration rate. A crime surge could perhaps convince 
policymakers that they needed to adopt a new set of criminal justice policies that included 
both prison reform in the form of privatization, and increased incarceration. 
 I also include controls for white and black residents per capita.  As my dependent 
variables are per capita, they account for changes in state population. The inclusion of 
controls produces lower estimates of the effect of privatization on incarceration, although 
it remains highly significant. State populations and racial characteristics were taken from 
the U.S. Census Bureau. For years before 2010, this data was compiled by Jordan and 
Grossman (2017). 
 In Table 4.3, I present the results of these models. Most controls are omitted from 
table 4.3 for brevity. Estimated effects of partisan control are presented for comparison. 
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Table 4.3 
 
Effect of Privatization on Incarceration Per Capita 
 Year Fixed 
Effects 
Time Trends Year Fixed 
Effects with 
Controls 
Time Trends 
with Controls 
Privatization    53.71*** 
(15.05) 
 
    38.51*** 
(11.17 
44.04** 
(13.81) 
    30.27** 
(10.24) 
Democratic 
House 
 
NA NA -31.74* 
(15.74) 
-9.94 
(6.82) 
Democratic 
Senate 
 
NA NA -17.06 
(9.06) 
-14.05 
(9.51) 
Democratic 
Governor 
 
NA NA 15.95 
(13.58) 
-4.06 
(8.80) 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.79 0.91 0.90 0.94 
Observations 1850 1850 1850 1850 
*p < .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Prison privatization has a highly significant effect on incarceration per capita regardless 
of specification. The smallest estimated effect of prison privatization is roughly 30 
prisoners per 100,000 residents. To put this in perspective, the average state incarceration 
rate in 2014 was 390 prisoners per 100,000 residents and the average state incarceration 
rate for states with private prisons was 447 prisoners per 100,000 residents. This suggests 
that if privatizing states had never privatized, they would have at least 7% fewer 
prisoners.   
 
Lag and Lead Effects 
 
If privatization has a causal effect on incarceration through pro-incarceration 
advocacy by private prison firms, then privatization should not have an effect on 
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incarceration before private prison firms began lobbying. There is some risk that private 
prison firms began their advocacy before private prisons began to operate such as when a 
firm signed a contract with a state. Thus, it is possible that the appearance of a retroactive 
effect of privatization on incarceration may be consistent with my theory, if it only 
occurred in the years immediately before privatization.  On the other hand, if 
privatization appears to have a retroactive effect several years before the operation of 
private prisons began, then it is likely that the supposed causal relationship between 
incarceration and prison privatization is spurious.  
 I can estimate the effects of privatization on incarceration immediately before and 
after privatization. To do this, I exclude all observations following the first decade of 
treatment. I then use year dummies for each year in the decade leading up to the 
implementation of privatization, as well as each year in the decade beginning with the 
implementation of privatization. My data set begins in 1978 so for each state I have data 
for the years immediately before the implementation for privatization. Some states 
discontinued the use of private prisons before a decade of their use elapsed. In these 
cases, I excluded all years in which they no longer used for-profit private prisons.  
 This means that each model has twenty independent variables of interest, with a 
variable corresponding to each year in the decade before and after privatization. With 
four specifications of the model and with the standard level of statistical significance 
(p=0.05), the expected number of false positives is two. In a single specification, the year 
immediately prior to privatization, had a statistically significant effect on incarceration at 
the .05 level. In contrast, across all specifications, half the years following privatization 
had a statistically significant effect on privatization. All specifications show the estimated 
effect of privatization rose at the time of privatization. These results are consistent with 
prison privatization having a causal effect on incarceration.   
 
Prison Crowding and Privatization 
 
Political advocacy is not the only way that the entrance of private prison firms 
into a state could increase incarceration. Private prisons could have solved problems, 
such as overcrowded prison facilities, which kept states from incarcerating as many 
prisoners as they would have liked.  
.  States could have wished to increase incarceration but lacked the prison capacity 
to do so. In some cases, private prisons have built correctional facilities “on spec” hoping 
that they would eventually be filled through government contracts (Price, 2006). In 
others, private prisons located in one state have housed prisoners from other states. In 
such situations, states could quickly increase the number of available prison beds to hold 
prisoners. If this is true, we should see states that were the most capacity-constrained 
experience the highest increase in incarceration following prison privatization. 
 The Bureau of Justice Statistics collects data regarding the capacity of state prison 
systems   and the number of prisoners as a percentage of system capacity. States report 
multiple types of prison capacity, such as operational, rated, or designed capacity. 
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Therefore, I rely on the number of prisoners as a percentage of the highest and lowest 
reported prison capacity. If states were incarcerating fewer prisoners than they would like 
due to crowded prisons, states with relatively more crowded prisons would experience 
greater increases in their incarceration rates. 
 Below is the relative incarceration rate of privatizing-states based on how 
crowded their prisons were at the time of privatization. Prison capacity for Alaska and 
Florida were not available for the year in which they privatized, so I used the reported 
capacity on the last day of the previous year for those states. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 depict 
the difference in incarceration between privatizing states and all states by level of prison 
crowding at time of privatization. 
Figure 4.4 
 
Relative Incarceration Rate of Privatizing States by Level of Prison Crowding as 
Percent of Highest Reported Capacity 
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Figure 4.5 
 
Relative Incarceration Rate of Privatizing States by Level of Prison Crowding as 
Percent of Lowest Reported Capacity 
 
 
 
The least crowded prison systems, those with spare capacity, were the states that 
experienced the greatest growth. If prison privatization encouraged increased 
incarceration because prison capacity had previously been insufficient, I would expect to 
see the opposite trend.  
Another way to test the possibility that prison privatization drives incarceration 
would be to include measures of crowding within my time series model. Unfortunately, 
when states report capacity to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, some states include private 
prison capacity. Thus, a state that appears to have plenty of capacity may have extremely 
crowded state prisons and is dependent on private prisons to deal with overcrowding. 
Further, not all states report capacity to Bureau of Justice Statistics. 
To test whether privatization may drive increased incarceration by solving 
capacity constraints, I exploit the fact that most prison facilities are only used to house 
one sex of prisoners and that many privatizing states only held one sex of prisoners in 
private for-profit prisons, or introduced the use of private prisons at different times for 
each sex.  
Most correctional facilities house only female or male prisoners. The most recent 
Census of State and Federal Adult Correctional Facilities listed 1821 correctional 
facilities in the United States. Of these only 276 (15%) were authorized to house both 
-100
0
100
200
300
-10 0
Prisoners
Per
Capita
Years Relative to Treatment
At/Over Capacity Under Capacity
38  
sexes. These coed facilities contained 6% of the total correctional facility population. Not 
all of these facilities were coed in practice, however. Twenty of these facilities reported 
an average daily female population of zero, while for these facilities as a whole, female 
prisoners comprised 17% of the inmate population.  
If a state were to begin housing some of its male prisoners in private prisons, it 
would free up room for additional male prisoners. This is true whether or not the male 
prisoners came from male-only or coed correctional facilities. If male prisoners were 
relocated from coed public facilities to private facilities, it could free up room for 
additional female prisoners. But because not all male prisoners are coming from coed 
public facilities, the use of private prisons to house male prisoners should have a greater 
effect on crowding of male prisons than of female prisons.  
This is complicated by the vastly greater size of the male prison population. 
Placing male prisoners into private prisons would free up more prison cells for male 
prisoners in absolute numbers than it would for female prisoners. But since there are so 
many more male prisoners, if these newly open prison cells were used to house female 
prisoners, it could free up more additional prison cells for female prisoners in percentage 
terms. Thus, if privatization increases incarceration by overcoming capacity constraints, 
it is not clear what we should expect the effect of male prison privatization to be. 
 In contrast, it is clear what we should expect the effect of female prison 
privatization to be. Since there are so few female prisoners, placing female prisoners into 
private prisons would increase female incarceration, if overcoming capacity constraints is 
the mechanism by which privatization increases incarceration. However, it would not 
meaningfully increase male incarceration because the absolute number of female 
prisoners in private prisons is so small.  
To model the effect of privatization by sex on incarceration, I make the following 
changes to my model. While in other specifications of my time series model, the 
independent variable of interest was whether or not a state used for-profit private prisons 
in a given year, in the following model I have three independent variables of interest 
corresponding to whether a state used for-profit prisons in a given year for male 
prisoners, female prisoners, or both, which is represented by an interaction term. I also 
include dummy variables for state-years in which privatization of male prisons and 
female prisons has ended, as well as an interaction term for those two dummy variables. 
Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 present the effect of privatization by sex on prisoners per capita, 
male prisoners per capita, and female prisoners per capita, respectively.  
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Table 4.4 
 
Effect of Privatization on Incarceration Per Capita 
 Year Fixed 
Effects 
Time Trends Year Fixed 
Effects with 
Controls 
Time Trends 
with Controls 
Privatization 
(Male)  
   57.53** 
(19.53) 
 
  35.95** 
(11.74) 
47.96** 
(17.31) 
    26.63* 
(11.83) 
Privatization 
(Female) 
 
54.39 
(30.71) 
44.15* 
(19.42) 
33.45 
(31.56) 
18.53 
(16.51) 
Interaction 
 
-60.19 
(31.69) 
-30.15 
(17.48) 
-37.16 
(32.51) 
-1.97 
(16.59) 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.89 0.93 0.90 0.94 
Observations 1850 1850 1850 1850 
*p < .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.5 
 
Effect of Privatization on Male Incarceration Per Capita (Per Male Residents) 
 Year Fixed 
Effects 
Time Trends Year Fixed 
Effects with 
Controls 
Time Trends 
with Controls 
Privatization 
(Male) 
   101.92** 
(36.12) 
 
 62.89** 
(21.89) 
 86.65** 
(32.15) 
   44.70*  
(22.11) 
Privatization 
(Female) 
 
78.99 
(52.24) 
77.81* 
(30.68) 
45.10 
(47.39) 
25.67 
(25.69) 
Interaction 
 
-93.78 
(48.75) 
-50.36* 
(25.19) 
-55.76 
(49.37) 
7.00 
(25.14) 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.89 0.93 0.90 0.94 
Observations 1850 1850 1850 1850 
*p < .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.6 
 
Effect of Privatization on Female Incarceration Per Capita (Per Female Residents) 
 Year Fixed 
Effects 
Time Trends Year Fixed 
Effects with 
Controls 
Time Trends 
with Controls 
Privatization 
(Male) 
 
   13.02** 
(4.45) 
 
 7.99* 
(3.24) 
 8.70* 
(3.65) 
6.73* 
(3.04) 
Privatization 
(Female) 
23.66 
(15.61) 
7.23 
(8.77) 
15.36 
(15.56) 
5.20 
(8.19) 
 
Interaction 
 
-23.67 
(9.68) 
-6.51 
(9.30) 
-13.58 
(15.94) 
-4.16 
(8.73) 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.82 0.91 0.85 0.92 
Observations 1850 1850 1850 1850 
*p < .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Privatizing male correctional facilities has a highly significant effect on overall 
incarceration, incarceration of male prisoners, and incarceration of female prisoners. The 
effect is robust to use of year fixed effects or state specific time trends, as well as 
incorporation of controls. The effect size is large and consistent with the effect size of 
privatization in general. Privatizing only female correctional facilities has a significant 
effect on male and overall incarceration rates, under a single specification. The effect of 
privatization on incarceration then is primarily, if not entirely, driven by the privatization 
of male facilities. 
 Privatization of female facilities has no effect on female incarceration. This is 
completely inconsistent with the theory that privatization drives incarceration by solving 
prison overcrowding. Instead, only the privatization of male facilities affects the female 
incarceration rate.  
That the effects of prison privatization are really the effects of privatizing men’s 
prisons fits well with the politics-based explanation for the link between privatization and 
incarceration because states that use private prisons hold substantially more male than 
female prisoners in private prisons. If private prison firms have more incentives to lobby 
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for increased incarceration in states in which they have larger market share, private prison 
firms should be more likely to lobby in states that have privatized male correctional 
facilities than they are in states that have privatized female correctional facilities.  
Privatization’s effect on state politics explains the relationship much better than does 
privatization’s effect on overcrowding.  
 
Price Sensitivity and Incarceration 
 
 Private prisons could increase incarceration rates by lowering the price of 
incarceration. If states are sensitive to the price of incarceration, private prisons could 
induce higher incarceration if they are able to provide more cost-effective prisons or to 
constrain the costs of the public prison system through competition.  
 There is not clear evidence that private prisons cost governments less than 
comparable public prisons. The General Accounting Office (2007) in a review of the 
federal government’s use of private prisons said that it was too difficult to determine 
whether private prisons delivered savings with available data. A meta-analysis by Pratt 
and Maahs (1999) found no difference between the cost of private and public prisons. A 
few scholars have argued that private prisons do yield meaningful savings, such as 
McDonald and Carlson (2005) and Hakim and Blackstone (2014). 
 Even if private prisons charged states the same amount per prisoner as the public 
prison system, it is possible that private prisons still saved states money by constraining 
the growth of public prison costs. Blumstein, Cohen and Seth (2007) found that states 
that had any prisoners in private prisons in 1996, whether for-profit or profit, experienced 
lower growth in corrections expenditures per prisoner. The authors suggested his could 
happen through either competition or the public prison system learning from private 
prisons. 
 That the privatization of male correctional facilities drives increased female 
incarceration argues against this. If a state successfully reduced the cost of housing male 
prisoners by privatizing male prisons, there would be no reason to expect the number of 
female prisoners to increase. There might even be reason to expect the opposite. If the 
price of imprisoning men falls, states might choose to incarcerate more men. The fall in 
the price of imprisoning men would not directly affect the price of imprisoning women. If 
correctional budgets are fixed, it is even possible that fewer women would be imprisoned 
as imprisoning men becomes more attractive due to cost savings and, more of the 
correctional budget might be allocated to male incarceration.  Therefore, it is unlikely 
that privatization drives incarceration increases through cost savings. 
I further test the possibility that price sensitivity can explain the relationship 
between incarceration and privatization by estimating the effect of prison privatization on 
corrections spending per prisoner. With my data set, I am able to both exploit the 
staggered introduction of prison privatization as well as estimate the cost of prison 
privatization on correctional spending across the entire period of contemporary private 
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prison use, which Blumstein, Cohen, and Seth could not. This also allows me to control 
for state-specific trends in corrections expenditures, 
I use the Annual Surveys of State and Local Government Finance to obtain 
corrections expenditures between 1978 and 2014.  State-level corrections expenditures 
were available for all these years. Total local corrections expenditures by state were 
available for these years, with the exception of 2001 and 2003. Expenditures are reported 
in thousands. The number of prisoners under state jurisdiction is taken, as before, from 
the Bureau of Justice Statistics. 
Using the natural log of the sum of state corrections expenditures and local 
corrections expenditures within a state allows me to estimate the effect of privatization on 
all corrections expenditures within a state. It also allows for comparable expenditure 
measures between the majority of states that separate out state and local corrections 
expenditures and states like Hawaii that do not. The downside of this is that we might 
expect the effects of prison privatization to affect state expenditures but not local 
expenditures on jails. In Table 4.7 and 4.8, using my time-series cross-sectional model, I 
present the effects of privatization on logged state expenditures and then on logged 
combined state and local expenditures.  I find no evidence that prison privatization 
reduces corrections expenditures per prisoner.  
Table 4.7 
 
Effect of Privatization on State Corrections Expenditures Per Prisoner (Logged) 
 Year Fixed 
Effects 
Time Trends Year Fixed 
Effects with 
Controls 
Time Trends 
with Controls 
Privatization 0.01 
(0.04) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
 
0.06 
(0.04) 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.86 0.89 0.87 0.93 
Observations 1850 1850 1850 1850 
*p < .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.8 
 
Effect of Privatization on State and Local Corrections Expenditures, Combined, Per 
Prisoner (Logged) 
 Year Fixed 
Effects 
Time Trends Year Fixed 
Effects with 
Controls 
Time Trends 
with Controls 
Privatization 0.02 
(0.05) 
 
0.04 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.90 0.92 0.90 0.93 
Observations 1750 1750 1750 1750 
*p < .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Whether estimating the effect of prison privatization on state correctional 
spending per prisoner or on the combined state and local correctional spending per 
prisoner, I find no significant results regardless of the use of year fixed effects or state-
specific time trends. The estimated effect of privatization on correctional spending per 
prisoner is not only insignificant but the estimated effect is that privatization causes an 
increase in logged correctional spending per prisoner. This suggests that any increase in 
incarceration rates following prison privatization is not driven by states choosing to 
incarcerate more prisoners in response to a lower cost of incarceration 
 Given that prison privatization predicts higher levels of incarceration but no effect 
on expenditures per prisoner, it is not surprising that prison privatization also predicts 
higher levels of corrections expenditures per state resident.  
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Table 4.9 
 
Effect of Privatization on State Corrections Expenditures Per Capita 
 Year Fixed 
Effects 
Time Trends Year Fixed 
Effects with 
Controls 
Time Trends 
with Controls 
Privatization 0.09 
(0.05) 
 
   0.15* 
   (0.07) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
    0.10* 
(0.04) 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.94 0.91 0.95 0.94 
Observations 1850 1850 1850 1850 
*p < .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 4.10 
 
Effect of Privatization on State and Local Corrections Expenditures Per Capita 
 Year Fixed 
Effects 
Time Trends Year Fixed 
Effects with 
Controls 
Time Trends 
with Controls 
Privatization 0.09* 
(0.04) 
 
    0.12 
     (0.07) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
  0.05 
(0.04) 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.96 0.92 0.96 0.95 
Observations 1750 1750 1750 1750 
*p < .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
The estimated effect varies with specification from roughly a four percent to 
fifteen percent increase in correctional expenditures.   The average estimated effect of 
privatization on states correctional expenditures is about 10%, implying that almost a 
tenth of state correctional expenditures are attributable to the effect of privatization. 
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Incarceration and Internal Private Prison Operations 
 
Mukherjee (2014) argued that private prisons increase incarceration by making 
inmates held in private prisons serve a longer share of their sentences through greater 
usage of conduct violations, making fewer prisoners eligible for early release. Based on 
the introduction of private prisons to Mississippi, she estimates that this results in 
privately held prisoners serving sentences that are 7% longer. This clearly illustrates a 
non-political mechanism through which privatization may increase incarceration. Yet the 
magnitude of the effect found by Mukherjee is far too small to account for the impact of 
privatization on incarceration found by my model. My finding suggest that incarceration 
is at least 7% higher in states which privatize. The median share of privately held 
prisoners across all states with any private prisoners is 12% (BJS, 2019), which would 
imply these states would experience a roughly 0.8% increase in incarceration due to 
conduct violations. Mukherjee’s findings would be insufficient to explain away the total 
increase in incarceration found by my model. 
Second, there does not appear to be a general effect of privatization on prison 
sentences. To estimate the average prison sentence per state, I use a method taken from 
Raphael and Stoll (2013) where the average served prison sentence is calculated by the 
ratio of sentenced prisoners in a given jurisdiction to the number of sentenced prisoners 
released in a given year.  
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Table 4.11 
 
Effect of Privatization on Length of Served Prison Sentences in Years 
 Year Fixed 
Effects 
Time Trends Year Fixed 
Effects with 
Controls 
Time Trends 
with Controls 
Privatization 
(Male) 
 
-0.145   
(0.17) 
 
  -0.24 
(0.16) 
 -0.12 
(0.15) 
    -0.22 
(0.13) 
Privatization 
(Female) 
-0.16 
(0.18) 
-0.08 
(0.17) 
-0.15 
(0.17) 
-0.10 
(0.22) 
 
Interaction 
 
0.29 
(0.21) 
0.24 
(0.18) 
0.23 
(0.18) 
0.20 
(0.22) 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.38 0.50 0.40 0.51 
Observations 1849 1849 1849 1849 
*p < .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Privatization and Prison Admissions 
 
In theory, privatization could increase incarceration by either increasing sentence 
length or the number of individuals sentenced to prison. As privatization has no effect on 
sentence length, this implies that privatization increases the rate of admission to prison. I 
was able to examine this question by applying the same time-series cross-sectional 
analysis I used earlier in this chapter, to estimate the effect of prison privatization on 
admissions to state prison systems per capita. Data on prison admissions were taken from 
the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Prisoner Series. Data begins in 1978. The results are 
presented in Table 4.12. 
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Table 4.12 
 
Effect of Privatization on Prison Admissions Per Capita 
 Year Fixed 
Effects 
Time Trends Year Fixed 
Effects with 
Controls 
Time Trends 
with Controls 
Privatization 
(Male) 
 
37.36* 
(16.81) 
 
  35.54* 
(13.98) 
 28.20 
(15.04) 
    27.30* 
(11.13) 
Privatization 
(Female) 
58.95 
(48.49) 
38.19 
(26.79) 
49.44 
(44.25) 
17.81 
(26.23) 
 
Interaction 
 
-80.69 
37.04 
-48.47 
(24.15) 
-66.45 
(43.66) 
-24.31 
(24.01) 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.68 0.76 0.70 0.80 
Observations 1850 1850 1850 1850 
*p < .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
The effect of privatization on prison admissions per capita is lower than the 
estimated effect of privatization on incarceration per capita. For specifications that 
include year fixed effects, the effect of privatization of male facilities on admissions per 
capita is roughly one quarter to one third less than the effect of privatization of male 
facilities on prisoners per capita. For specifications that include state specific time trends, 
the difference between the estimated effects on prison admissions per capita and 
prisoners per capita is quite small. This suggests that the increase in incarceration 
associated with prison privatization is driven entirely by more individuals entering 
prisons.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Incarceration rates increased in states that adopted prison privatization. The effect 
is robust to model specification. The increase in incarceration rates cannot be explained 
by a pre-existing trend where private prisons enter states where incarceration rates are 
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already trending upwards, because my models include controls for state-specific trends. 
This can also be seen by estimating the effect of privatization on years before 
privatization occurred which shows that there is no retroactive effect of privatization. 
Further, by just looking at incarceration rates in states that privatized relative to the 
national average, it is clear that states that privatized did not have unusually high 
incarceration rates prior to the adoption of private prisons. 
There are potential mechanisms by which prison privatization could lead to 
increased incarceration that do not involve political advocacy such as alleviating capacity 
constraints or by lowering the costs of incarceration. This is not consistent with my 
findings, because the states with the least crowded prisons increased incarceration the 
most following privatization, and I find no evidence that prison privatization makes 
incarceration more affordable for states.  
Political advocacy by private prison firms explains the changes in incarceration 
rates over time. Incarceration rates increase following privatization, not before states are 
treated. Prison admissions also appear to increase following privatization, although the 
evidence is not quite as clear as with incarceration.  
Overall, the evidence suggests what my theory predicts. Prison privatization 
increases incarceration in a manner consistent with advocacy-driven incarceration. 
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Chapter 5: Political Strategies of Private Prison Firms and 
Corrections Officer Unions 
 If private prison firms prefer higher incarceration, what political strategy would 
we expect them to adopt? If corrections officer unions want higher incarceration, how 
would we expect it to shape their behavior? For typical interest groups with popular 
goals, it is an easy question. The annual reports of the Sierra Club and the National Rifle 
Association reveal how they work to advance environmental protection and defend the 
Second Amendment, respectively. Yet despite public suspicion of private prison firms 
and corrections officer unions, both reject the claim that they seek to increase 
incarceration. 
 Despite the disclaimers of private prison firms and corrections officer unions, it is 
possible to make predictions about how relative prioritization of increasing incarceration 
should shape political strategies. First, if ceteris paribus, private prison firms benefit more 
from growth in incarceration than would corrections officer unions, then private prison 
firms should be more likely to promote increased incarceration. Private prison firms 
should lobby agencies responsible for criminal justice policies more intensely, lobby the 
legislature more on criminal justice issues, and this lobbying should be visible to other 
interest groups that work on criminal justice policy.  
 More generally, if private prison firms are interested in growth, we should expect 
them to take a proactive political strategy; firms should try to expand upon their status 
quo. This could come in the form of supporting increased incarceration, but it could also 
consist of seeking a larger market share, better fees for their services, or more favorable 
regulation.  
Corrections officer unions should take a more defensive political stance. This is 
because labor unions face a trade-off between employment and wages. The greater the 
level of wages they demand, the more they constrict the supply of employment. Much of 
the benefit of increased employment within a unionized workforce would go to future 
members of the union who would be hired as employment expands, rather than the 
incumbent union members who might prefer to restrict employment to boost wages. That 
is not to say that unions should be wholly defensive. Unions can still seek to improve 
upon the status quo to benefit their current members. They might lobby for increased 
compensation or improved working conditions. They might also value growth as more 
members likely increases their political influence over their employer, the state. Still, I 
expect there should be a clear distinction in the overall political orientation of firms and 
unions, with firms adopting a more proactive political strategy. 
 In this chapter, I look at whether private prison firms and corrections officer 
unions behave differently in the ways predicted by my theory. Does it look like private 
prisons lobby more on incarceration? Do private prison firms adopt more proactive 
political strategies? To examine this, I draw on a series of roughly one hundred 
interviews conducted with lobbyists, legislators, and interest group representatives. These 
interviews show that private prison firms make substantially higher incarceration-related 
political expenditures and private prison firms take a more proactive and more pro-
incarceration political stance than do corrections officer unions.  
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Selection of States 
 
I conducted interviews across five states: California, Arizona, Montana, Ohio, and 
Pennsylvania. I chose these states to provide a variety of regions, partisan orientation, and 
population sizes. They also differ in terms of corrections officer unions and private 
prisons.  
 Page (2011) argued that independent corrections officer unions were more 
politically powerful than were corrections officer unions that were affiliated with larger 
umbrella unions. While all five states have labor unions that represent corrections 
officers, the type of union varies. In California, an independent union called the 
California Correctional Peace Officer Association represents corrections officers and is 
generally regarded as one of the most powerful unions of its kind. In Arizona, multiple 
labor unions represent corrections officers including the Arizona Correctional Peace 
Officer Association, the Fraternal Order of Police, and the Arizona Corrections 
Association. In Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania State Corrections Officer Association 
represents corrections officers. In Ohio and Montana, general public employee unions 
represent corrections officers. This selection of states will allow me to compare union 
strength between independent and affiliated union types and see whether the 
Pennsylvania State Corrections Officer Association and the California Correctional Peace 
Officer Association are unusually influential, and in the case of the latter, live up to its 
reputation.  
 Arizona, California, Montana, and Ohio all incarcerated some adult 
prisoners in private prisons in 2016. Pennsylvania did not have traditional private prisons, 
but it did have privately operated correctional facilities in the form of adult halfway 
houses, that were operated by private prison firms, as well as by nonprofits.  In my 
interviews with Pennsylvania respondents, they made clear that they did not consider this 
to constitute prison privatization. When I asked about the political activities of private 
prisons in Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania respondents were insistent that private prison 
firms were not politically active, as Pennsylvania did not have private prisons. 
 Because private prison firms were not politically active, the Pennsylvania State 
Corrections Officers Association could not free-ride off private prisons even if it wanted 
to. If corrections officer unions are an important political force for increased 
incarceration, we should see this clearly in Pennsylvania. Arizona, Ohio, and Montana 
are useful cases as all three states have substantial market share held by private prisons. 
This is especially true in Montana, where a single private prison facility holds a large 
share of the entire state’s prison population. 
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Table 5.1 
 
Comparison of States, 2016 
 
State Corrections Officer 
Union 
% Prisoners in 
Private Prisons 
Prisoners Per 
Capita 
Arizona Multiple Unions, 
including 
independent 
 
19.6 585 
California Independent Union 
 
5.4 331 
Montana Affiliated with AFL-
CIO 
38.8 364 
Ohio Affiliated with AFL-
CIO 
12 449 
Pennsylvania Independent Union 
 
1.4 383 
 
Selection of Interview Subjects 
 
I identified legislators of interest by their service on public safety, corrections, law 
enforcement, or judiciary committees. I first requested interviews with legislators. In a 
minority of cases, I was referred to a legislative staffer who was familiar with criminal 
justice politics. Legislators were selected from the current legislative sessions, except in 
California where the interview period spanned two legislative sessions.  Accordingly, I 
contacted legislators who served in the relevant committee in either legislative session. 
I identified Interest groups which are involved in criminal justice by examining 
public lobbying records of all years between 2013 and the year in which interviews were 
conducted in the chosen states. Additional interest groups were added to the sample when 
other respondents named them as being politically active on criminal justice issues and 
they were registered as lobbyists. I contacted interest groups directly seeking an 
interview. When no contact information was available, I contacted the lobbying firm that 
represented the interest group. Not all interest groups employed lobbyists outside of their 
organization. In a few cases, multiple interest groups referred my request for an interview 
to the same outside lobbyist. In that case, I interviewed the lobbyist on behalf of the first 
interest group to refer me to him or her.  
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 My focus on interest groups which engaged in substantial enough 
advocacy that they registered as lobbyists appeared to capture the relevant interest groups 
across states. In only a few cases were interest groups mentioned that did not register as 
lobbyists. Examples of non-registered interest groups included Black Lives Matter and 
individual victims of crimes and their families.  
Interviews were semi-structured. I asked interest groups to describe a recent 
criminal justice issue they worked on, who their allies and opponents were, and whether 
they pursued a primarily proactive or defensive political strategy. I told respondents that a 
proactive political strategy consists of trying to improve upon the status quo, and a 
defensive political strategy consists of trying to preserve the status quo. I then asked them 
to evaluate the political orientation (whether proactive or defensive) of private prison 
firms, corrections officer unions, and law enforcement unions. I asked them to evaluate 
law enforcement unions because law enforcement unions are another type of union 
inherently connected to criminal justice policies. If unions tend to be defensive in 
general, this should hold true for both law enforcement and corrections officer unions. 
When interviewing corrections officer unions or private prison firms, I also asked 
whether they lobbied on criminal justice issues in general and sentencing in particular. 
Legislators were asked the same questions. However, instead of asking them a 
recent issue they worked on related to criminal justice, I asked about recent criminal 
justice issues on which they were lobbied. Interviews were conducted between December 
2016 and March 2018 both in person and by phone. 
Table 5.2 
Interviews by State 
State Number Interest Groups 
Interviewed 
Number Legislative 
Offices Interviewed 
Arizona 13 3 
California 24 9 
Ohio 10 4 
Montana 9 7 
Pennsylvania 8 10 
Total 64 33 
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Response rates were similar across states. Slightly less than half of all interest 
groups agreed to interviews1 and slightly less than a sixth of all legislative offices agreed 
to interviews. 
Table 5.3 
 
Response Rate by State 
 
 
State Percent Interest Groups 
Interviewed 
Percent Legislative 
Offices Interviewed 
Arizona 50% 13% 
California 55% 19% 
Ohio 43% 12% 
Montana 41% 17% 
Pennsylvania 36% 21% 
Total 47% 17% 
 
Private prison firms declined to speak with me, although I was able to interview 
representatives of nonprofit prison operators and private juvenile detention centers. This 
validated my interview strategy of not only seeking to interview corrections officer union 
and private prison firms, but also those interest groups and legislators who were best in a 
position to observe their political activity. I was able to speak with multiple 
representatives of corrections officer unions. Table 5.4 depicts the response rate by 
respondent type across all five states. In a few cases, responses were clearly differentiated 
by type of interest group. I describe these distinctions later in the chapter 
 
 
 
                                                       1 In a few cases, interest groups that were identified as being active in criminal justice politics denied this. For instance, several attorney associations said they only engaged in advocacy on civil law not criminal law, or groups said that they currently only engaged in federal advocacy. In these cases, they were not included in the response rate. 
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Table 5.4 
 
Response Rate by Respondent Type Across All States 
 
 
Respondent Type Response Rate 
Corrections/Law Enforcement Groups 52% 
Private Prison Firms 0% 
Left-wing Groups 48% 
Right-wing Groups 36% 
All Other Interest Groups 39% 
Democratic Party Legislators 22% 
Republican Party Legislators 13% 
 
Political Strategies by Sector 
 
 One of the major predictions of my theory was that private prison firms 
would adopt a more proactive political strategy than would corrections officer unions. 
This prediction was confirmed by the interviews.  Respondents viewed private prison 
firms as taking a more proactive political strategy than corrections officer unions. 
Representatives of corrections officer unions agreed that they did not have a primarily 
proactive political strategy, although they viewed themselves as having a balanced 
political strategy rather than being primarily defensive. Respondents were also much 
more likely to claim that private prison firms sought to increase incarceration.  
 
Private Prisons 
 
 In Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Montana, private prison firms were viewed as 
formidable political actors, with substantial political sophistication and financial 
resources. In Pennsylvania, respondents were insistent that their state did not have private 
prisons, despite some halfway houses being operated by the GEO Group, one of the 
major private prison firms in the nation.  In California, private prisons were viewed as no 
longer politically relevant, the same description that California respondents offered 
regarding the California Correctional Peace Officer Association.  
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Table 5.52 
How Respondents Viewed Orientation of Private Prisons Political Activity 
 Proactive Defensive Inactive Unsure Equal 
Split 
No 
Answer 
Arizona 9 0 1 6 0        0 
California 4 0 15 13 1 0 
Montana 7 3 2 4 0 0 
Ohio 3 1 1 8 0 1 
All States 23 4 19       31 1 1 
 
In both Montana and Arizona, a plurality of respondents described the political 
strategy of private prisons as proactive. California stands out for the relative political 
inactivity of private prison firms. The relative inactivity of private prisons in California 
appears to be a recent phenomenon. One respondent attributed the decline in political 
activity of California private prisons to California’s decision to realign its prison 
population by shifting prisoners to county jails while another suggested that they had 
given up due to unified opposition to prison privatization from the law enforcement and 
criminal justice community. This recent political inactivity was also exhibited by 
California’s famous corrections officer union, the California Correctional Peace Officer 
Association. 
 In conversation, respondents repeatedly returned to a few themes concerning the 
political activity of private prison firms. Across states private prisons were seen as 
politically sophisticated, and influential, partly due to heavy political spending, and 
having close ties to the governor and the executive branch.                                                        2 Pennsylvania omitted due to respondents’ claims that PA lacked private prisons.  
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● The administration has ideas that bear upon the private prisons. But as a general 
proposition, the administration in developing those ideas works with the private 
prisons. And by the time they come [to the floor], they’re on the same page. 
- Republican Ohio legislator 
● I think that happens at a higher level. I image it happens more at the governor’s 
office and cabinet and not at the level I’m at. . . .I would guess that’s very 
influential in the way that money is influential, but it doesn’t happen in public 
meetings in front of media. 
-Representative of a public defenders association 
● The lobbyist is quite well heeled, and he doesn’t get involved where we can see 
him. 
- Representative of a liberal advocacy group 
● I assume there is more going on than I'm aware of. 
- Representative of a domestic violence group 
●  A quietly proactive political strategy, they have a really good lobbyist who is 
connected very deep with Republicans in the legislature. 
- Representative of a law enforcement group 
 
● They work with the governor’s office and then directly with certain legislators, 
and since we’ve been here, we’ve never met with them. 
- Ohio Democratic legislator 
Money and sophistication were repeatedly cited as the source of political influence of 
private prison firms.  The clearest example of this came from Montana. Montana has a 
single private prison in Shelby County, operated by CoreCivic (formerly Corrections 
Corporation of America). As part of its contract with the state of Montana, Montana pays 
into an escrow fund that would allow the state to purchase the prison facility when the 
contract expires. With the state, facing a fiscal crunch, CoreCivic offered to turn over the 
approximately $30 million in the escrow fund to the state of Montana’s general budget in 
exchange for an extension of the contract between CoreCivic and Montana. 
This was a major political issue in Montana; It was brought up by multiple Montana 
respondents in interviews and caused a special legislative session to address the issue 
during which CoreCivic lobbied extremely hard according to respondents.  They were 
“lobbying for renewal of [the] state contract, almost to the point of it being 
uncomfortable” said a state legislator. “They publicly bribed the state of Montana” said a 
representative of an interest group. Another legislator described CoreCivic as having a 
“hostage-taking approach with their proposal in a time of great budget duress.”  Even so 
some of the respondents who viewed the political strategy as too aggressive or 
manipulative did express some grudging respect for CoreCivic’s political acumen and 
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their lobbyist who was described as being proactive at safeguarding their contract and 
rates. 
 In no state did corrections officer unions exert the same influence or receive the 
same grudging respect. Instead, they were viewed as minor, defensive political players--
when they were viewed as active at all. 
 
Corrections Officer Unions 
 
Corrections officer unions were viewed as much less politically active and 
influential than private prison firms were. Respondents were more likely to describe 
corrections officer unions as pursuing a defensive political agenda, and corrections 
officer unions I interviewed also agreed with this statement 
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Table 5.6 
How Respondents Viewed Orientation of Corrections Officer Unions Political 
Activity 
 Proactive Defensive Inactive Unsure Equal 
Split 
No 
Answer 
Arizona 1 4 0 8 3 0 
California 4 5 6 18 0 0 
Montana 0 4 7 4 1 0 
Ohio 0 7 2 5 0 0 
Pennsylvania 1 9 2 5 1 0 
All States 6 29 17 40 5 0 
 
The hypothesis that corrections officer unions would be much less proactive than 
private prison companies is confirmed by the interviews. In no state did legislators and 
representatives of interest groups view corrections officer unions as more proactive than 
defensive. Respondents were four times more likely to describe corrections officer unions 
as defensive than proactive. They were also more than twice as likely to describe unions 
as inactive than proactive. In contrast, respondents were more likely to describe private 
prisons as proactive than either inactive or defensive.  
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Self-Evaluation of Corrections Officer Unions 
 
Over the course of my interviews, I spoke with representatives of several unions, 
which represented corrections officers. These representatives differed from other 
respondents because the corrections officer representatives did not view corrections 
officer unions as politically inactive. Further, every corrections officer union described 
themselves as having an equal split between proactive and defensive political activity. 
This could be due to a general reluctance for an organization to admit lacking a proactive 
agenda, or due to the unions having greater knowledge about their own activities.  
None of the corrections officer unions I spoke to describe their political agenda as 
supporting higher levels of incarceration. In fact, I received some complaints that the 
current level of incarceration was too high given the available prison staffing, leading to 
dangerous working conditions. 
● We are usually focused more on representing our members. Our main focus is on 
working with the legislature to try to get better benefits and better pay. We also 
represent our members in the case that any get disciplined. . . . We don’t 
participate if there is something that would affect sentencing-- we don’t take 
positions. 
 
They described themselves as focused on the economic well-being and working 
conditions of their members, rather than on sentencing laws or broader criminal justice 
issues. When asked to describe recent issues they worked on they listed lobbying for 
better training for dealing with mentally ill inmates, pay and staffing, and improving the 
grievance process. Union representatives differed on whether they felt they were subject 
to a trade-off between compensation and employment level. 
● We don’t have any way to make the department change the staffing level, we 
can’t prioritize it. 
● I don’t think that trade-off is real, have we seen worker population drop some? 
Yeah, but I think that’s more due to budgets than the trade-off between 
negotiation process. 
● There does become that issue where they'll say we'll increase entrance pay but 
you can only recruit two thirds of the number [of new hires] you want. 
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Independent Unions and the Decline of the CCPOA 
 
In no state were corrections officer unions viewed as politically proactive. This is true 
despite including California, whose corrections officer union is famous for political 
strength, and Pennsylvania, where private prison firms house a tiny share of prisoners and 
whose correction officer union is independent.  
Pennsylvania was the median state in terms of how proactive respondents perceived 
its corrections officer union. Pennsylvania respondents were slightly less likely to view 
their corrections officer unions as politically inactive but were much more likely to view 
their unions as politically defensive.  
 Pennsylvania’s unremarkable corrections officer unions suggest that even in the 
absence of private prisons, unions favor defensive lobbying and focus on typical labor 
issues such as compensation and conditions, not pro-incarceration advocacy. Even in 
California, home of the California Correctional Peace Officer Association, respondents 
were more likely to describe corrections officer unions as defensive or inactive than 
proactive. California was the state that had the most respondents who did believe that 
corrections officer unions were politically proactive. Further, many of the respondents 
who said that the CCPOA was politically inactive said that this had been a recent change 
and that the CCPOA had been extremely influential in the past. Respondents described an 
organization in retreat, both in terms of overall political engagement as well as a shift 
from a proactive to defensive orientation.  
● In years past they’ve been very proactive, but recently in the last three or four years 
they haven’t been very proactive.  Primarily reactive these days. 
- Representative of a trade association 
● Large and influential union. Don’t have as much power as a few years ago. Was a 
time even when budgets were being cut, formerly prisons would still get a 1 percent 
increase. Pendulum is swinging the other way. 
- Representative of an intergovernmental organization 
● People talked in the 90s how the CCPOA sponsored sentence-enhancement and were 
viewed as self-serving. Doesn’t happen, now they only happen to talk to people 
during contract time. 
- Chief of staff, Republican legislator 
The decline of the CCPOA happened over the same period of time as the political 
retreat of private prisons. This makes sense if both are a response to a political move in 
California to meaningfully reduce incarceration. At the same time, the free-riding 
argument suggests that if private prison firms withdrew from pro-incarceration lobbying 
then corrections officer unions would increase theirs. This did not happen despite 
CCPOA having a long history of political support of tough-on-crime policies. 
A California chief of staff suggested that the shift from criminal justice policies 
being decided by the state legislature to voters by ballot initiatives had weakened the 
62  
CCPOA. She also argued that the success of Proposition 47, an initiative which reduced 
California’s prison population, had made corrections officers less politically relevant and 
probation and parole officers more. 
This appears borne out by California lobbying disclosure data provided by the 
California Secretary of State. Lobbying expenditures by the CCPOA has stagnated over 
the past decade. In contrast, the Chief Probation Officers of California has increased 
lobbying expenditures as shown in Figure 5.1. 
Figure 5.1 
California Lobbying Expenditures 
 
That the California Correctional Peace Officer Association could decline so 
dramatically over a decade suggests that the ability of an independent corrections officer 
unions to play a major role in criminal justice is highly contingent on a favorable political 
environment. 
Unions that represented a wide variety of public employees, including corrections 
officers, did appear to experience some conflict between the generally right-leaning 
corrections officer population and the generally left-leaning orientation of labor unions. 
This supports the claim of Page (2008), that the California Correctional Peace Officer 
Association’s unusual level of political power came in part from its independence, 
whereas unions affiliated with an umbrella labor union like the AFL-CIO, sacrificed the 
specific interests of corrections officers. 
● We have a thousand law enforcement members and others who aren't law 
enforcement members and there is that balancing act.  Those guys are 
generally conservative, and we have this guy . . .   who said I think you're 
too liberal but [you] have to understand that we support those who support 
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us. And I said the far right is always going to attack us and vote against 
our issues. 
● The easy answer is yes- two and a half years ago the Black Lives Matter 
[movement] started and our correctional officers and police officers were 
very vocal, and they wanted us to take a position on the issue. Because of 
the sheer amount of different employees and employee classifications we 
represent and the ethnic makeup of our union, it was very difficult to take 
a position that pleased anyone. 
 
Law Enforcement Unions Across the States 
 
Law enforcement unions which represent police officers and sheriffs’ deputies, 
share some features with corrections officer unions. Like corrections officers, law 
enforcement officers work in the criminal justice field. Both sets of unions are also closer 
to, or viewed as closer to, the Republican Party than are most unions which represent 
public employees. My theory claims that unions qua unions will tend to be more 
defensive than will private firms. In all my interviews with interest groups, I was 
interested in how respondents viewed private prison firms and corrections officer unions.  
The interviews with law enforcement unions, as well as asking other respondents 
about law enforcement unions, offered a window into union dynamics in general. Like 
corrections officer unions, law enforcement unions are viewed by respondents as a whole 
as more defensive than proactive and preoccupied by the economic interests of their 
members more so than by broader criminal justice issues. Overall, respondents were more 
than two and a half times more likely to describe law enforcement unions as defensive 
than proactive. Further, respondents from both inside and outside the law enforcement 
community agreed that law enforcement unions placed substantially greater weight on 
labor issues than criminal justice issues. 
● On balance, they are in a defensive posture. Every so often they’ll bring 
something forward but it’s not about a law enforcement matter, it’s a benefits 
or pensions matter.  
- Republican Arizona legislator 
● They normally don’t lobby on criminal justice issues, they lobby on 
workplace conditions, the sort of things that labor unions lobby on.  In my 
experience they don’t lobby on things like death penalty or bail reform. 
- Democratic Pennsylvania legislator 
● I don’t see them being proactive for criminal justice as a whole, proactive on 
things that protects their membership, very focused on their membership and 
not on what can be achieved on the larger topic. 
- Democratic Pennsylvania legislator 
● Not really, there’s not a whole lot of issues that involve them.  
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        - Republican Ohio legislator 
 Occasionally, respondents would mention law enforcement unions 
supporting tougher criminal justice laws but generally in a secondary role, supporting a 
policy being championed by a legislator or other interest group. A law enforcement union 
representative explained its relationship with legislators on these bills as it is “more likely 
for them to come to us and ask if [the criminal justice bill is] practical, does it work, will 
this bill achieve the goal they have in mind.”  The exception to this was some 
respondents describing law enforcement unions working to increase penalties for assaults 
or other crimes against law enforcement officers.  Respondents’ views of law 
enforcement unions’ political activity are presented in Figure 5.2. 
Figure 5.2 
How Respondents Viewed Orientation of Law Enforcement Union Political Activity 
 
 One interpretation of this data, and the one I favor, is that unions are 
defensive and primarily concerned with the interests of their current members. Another 
possible interpretation is that these interviews were conducted in a time period where 
policy trends are moving away from lengthy sentences and tough-on-crime policies, and 
that accounts for both sets of unions taking a defensive role. Although this trend is 
occurring, I do not think it explains the defensiveness of law enforcement unions. First, 
unlike the corrections officer union in California, respondents did not generally describe 
law enforcement unions as going through a period of decline. Second, law enforcement 
interest groups that represent law enforcement leadership such as sheriffs, police chiefs, 
and chief probation and parole officers did not show the same evidence of defensiveness. 
The self-evaluations of law enforcement unions and law enforcement leadership 
organizations are presented in Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3 
Self-Description of Political Activity by Law Enforcement Unions and Law 
Enforcement Leadership Organizations (As Percentage of Responses) 
  
When asked whether their own organizations tended to be more proactive or 
defensive, the differences between labor unions and organizations that represented law 
enforcement leadership were stark.  This shows that the defensiveness of law 
enforcement labor unions cannot be explained away as some cultural norm of law 
enforcement diffidence. Nor can the defensiveness of law enforcement unions be 
explained as evidence of an unfavorable political environment directed toward all law 
enforcement organizations.  The defensiveness of law enforcement unions is entirely 
consistent with accounts of labor unions being naturally defensive. 
While law enforcement leaders and unions frequently listed groups from the other 
category as some of their most important allies, respondents from law enforcement 
leadership organizations were often critical of what they viewed as unions’ narrow and 
parochial interests. 
● Very insular perspective-- gets us in trouble as a profession. I don’t want 
to disparage labor unions, but they can be myopic towards nationwide 
trends. 
● Very focused on--don’t care much about traditional criminal justice issues. 
Their issues are slotted into typical labor union. Better wages, better 
benefits, better place to work. I don’t think they care about the increase in 
recidivism rate. . .. How can we get our folks better paid and more safe. . .. 
010
2030
4050
6070
80
Rank-and-file unions LeadershipProactive Defensive
66  
Labor-management division. Management can work at a higher level as 
compared to more tangible paycheck issues. 
 
Like corrections officer unions, law enforcement unions experience tensions 
between their more right-leaning criminal justice priorities and their more left-leaning 
concerns about compensation and job security. One strategy taken was to cultivate 
relationships with both parties but emphasizing different goals. A law enforcement union 
representative in California explained their strategy as: 
Membership is overwhelmingly Republican. Have two lobbyists--one that 
works on criminal justice, one that works on labor issues. Democrats are good 
on meat-and-potatoes issues like benefits, but GOP is good on guns and 
bullets issues. 
 
Do Private Prison Firms or Corrections Officer Unions Lobby on Incarceration? 
 
 Does any of the political activity of private prison firms or corrections officer 
unions focus on supporting higher levels of incarceration? Private prison firms reject this 
claim. Likewise, multiple representatives of labor unions that serve corrections officers 
denied this claim in interviews with me. “We don’t participate if there is something that 
would affect sentencing. We don’t take positions,” one such representative told me.  
Despite these denials, there is widespread belief among both activists and 
politicians that both private prison companies and corrections officer unions support 
higher incarceration, although not all critics believe it is true of both interest groups. 
There is also clear evidence of cases in which both private prison companies and 
corrections officer unions did work to increase incarceration. In the “kids for cash” 
scandal in Pennsylvania, an operator of a  private  juvenile detention facility  was accused 
of bribing judges to sentence juveniles, many of whom were accused of minor crimes, to 
serve sentences in the  private  facility, and two judges were convicted of racketeering 
(Swift, 2009). When it comes to corrections officer unions, the California Correctional 
Peace Officer Association is well-known for its past support of tough-on-crime policies 
such as  California’s three-strikes law (Page, 2011) as well as funding victims’ rights 
groups  that supported longer sentences for violent crimes (Carrasco and Petersilia, 2006; 
Page, 2011). 
Volokh (2008) described his own hunt for evidence that private prison firms 
support increased incarceration as turning up only a single piece of clear evidence:  the 
chairman of the GEO Group (then Wackenhut) testified in favor of the Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. Accordingly, Volokh argues that the 
currently available evidence that private prison firms increase incarceration is weak.  
A substantial share of respondents, who have direct knowledge and experience of 
criminal justice politics, brought up their own suspicions with me, unprompted. While 
both private prison firms and corrections officer unions were described as supporting 
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increased incarceration by at least some respondents, this belief was much more common 
regarding private prison firms. This does not prove that private prison firms try to 
increase incarceration, but it does show that it is not a fringe suspicion or conspiracy 
theory. Many people who work every day on criminal justice policies view private prison 
firms as working to increase incarceration. 
  Figure 5.4 refers only to respondents who brought up this belief without being 
prompted in interviews. Interviews were structured such that I asked respondents whether 
private prison firms had a primarily proactive or defensive strategy. Then I would ask 
what issues or goals private prison firms pursued. I did the same when asking 
respondents about corrections officer unions. The fact that so many respondents told me 
that private prison firms worked to increase incarceration shows that this belief is 
widespread among criminal justice politics experts. 
 
Figure 5.4 
Percentage of respondents that believe that interest groups support higher 
incarceration3 
 
 This belief was held across the states. In every state except Pennsylvania, multiple 
respondents believed that prison firms supported higher incarceration. In the majority of 
states not even a single respondent brought up the same concern about corrections officer 
unions. The prevalence of this belief in regard to private prison firms did differ by                                                       3 In addition, six percent of respondents in Montana claimed that private prison firms opposed reducing the prison population and eleven percent of respondents in Pennsylvania believed that corrections officer unions opposed reducing the prison population. 
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respondent type. Corrections officer unions were unanimous in holding this belief while, 
it was rejected by the rest of the law enforcement community. 
 
Table 5.7 
Belief that Private Prisons Support Higher Incarceration, By Respondent Type 
Respondent Type % 
Corrections Officer Unions 100% 
Law Enforcement Organizations 0% 
Left-wing Organizations 24% 
Right-Wing Organizations 25% 
All Other Interest Groups 21% 
Democratic Legislators 13% 
Republican Legislators 0% 
 
 Why were corrections officer unions so consistent in expressing this belief about 
private prison companies? It could be since they are competitors, corrections officers pay 
more attention to private prison firms or are more likely to bring up potential criticisms of 
private prison firms. It could also come from the structure of the interview. I directly 
asked corrections officer unions whether they lobbied on sentencing laws.  Perhaps that 
primed them to think about private prison firms engaging in that activity.  
  The unprompted opinions about private prison firms were also expressed more by 
interest groups than by legislative offices. While right leaning or libertarian groups were 
as likely to express this belief as left wing groups, no Republican legislator brought up 
this belief in conversation with me. 
Respondents described private firms as:   
● Much more proactive. [We’ve been] told by their lobbyists for political reasons 
they don't take positions on sentencing reform because they don't want to be seen 
as artificially controlling prison population, but don’t believe that. Plenty of 
conversations behind the scenes that address the idea that it's a good thing to keep 
the criminal code as it is to increase incarceration. 
- Representative of a prison reform group 
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● In a state like Arizona, you can’t just look at sentencing reform or prison reform . 
. . because you have this very powerful lobby of private prisons. If you’re not 
facing this head down, all your efforts to change sentencing law will come to 
nothing because those companies will always be lobbying for more prisons for 
longer sentencing. 
- Representative of a religious advocacy group 
● Always at the front of proposed legislation. 
- Representative of a criminal justice reform group 
 
● Epitome of criminal justice industrial complex, like a business. 
- Representative of a law enforcement group 
● Their objective is to keep every bed filled, they’re not interested in sentencing 
reform and who we should be incarcerating and who we shouldn't, because if you 
. . . don't keep the public prison overflowing how will you keep the [private] 
prisons full. 
- Representative of a corrections officer union 
 
● They generally tend to favor bills that increase criminal penalties because it’s 
good for business. 
- Representative of a trade association 
 
Some respondents had similar views of corrections officer unions or even viewed 
corrections officer unions and private prison firms as pursuing the same political goals. 
 
●  When people hand out favors to private interests, they’re going to come asking 
for more. It also applies to public prison guards. A nexus of special interests 
driving the expansion of criminalization. 
- Representative of a conservative advocacy group 
● They want to make sure that prison environments are maintained and not closed 
and talked about how jobs would be lost. They advocate for tough on crime on 
crime policies. It’s job security. 
- Democratic Pennsylvania legislator 
 The only specific examples of corrections officer unions supporting higher 
sentences came from Ohio where a legislator said that the union wanted higher penalties 
for inmates that assaulted corrections officers I think it is more appropriate to interpret 
such policies as a desire to improve working conditions or seek parity of status with law 
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enforcement officers rather than an effort to increase the prison population.  One 
legislator in Arizona described a corrections officer union as being against reducing 
prison population, but still emphasizing its economic interests. 
● Not really active, if it deals with pensions, benefits, they’ll speak up. I 
think they did speak in favor of a bill that we ran to drain off some of the 
population from the prison system. They opposed it but they didn’t have 
an ask. 
Many more respondents described corrections officer unions as avoiding criminal 
justice issues while emphasizing the economic interests of their members. 
● They lobby on their immediate conditions not sentencing laws. They are 
defensive. 
- Republican Ohio legislator 
● Their main mission is protecting the economic well-being of members and 
their contract and their working condition. They want to be able to have 
their way inside [prisons]. 
- Representative of a religious advocacy group 
● What you tend to see, groups that are union-based are at least 50 [percent] 
reactive.. 
- Representative of a law enforcement group 
● I think they lobby on labor issues, protective bargaining collection, 
grievance protections, union protections, dues, health care issues. 
- Representative of a law enforcement organization  
● Never heard from them. 
- Republican Montana legislator 
 
● Just not organized and don’t have the ability to leave [their] jobs and 
lobby for themselves, 
- Democratic Montana legislator 
 Legislators and interest group representatives who believed that private prisons 
supported higher incarceration, did not provide specific examples of private prisons 
working in favor of policies that would lead to higher rates of incarceration, or even 
lobbying directly on sentencing. A representative of a nonprofit organization which 
operates halfway houses and community corrections facilities, and thus is in some sense a 
competitor of private prisons within the state, said:  
x I’ve heard through the grapevine that private prisons would want the tough 
on crime and the old way of hammering more people in prison, and I think 
that could be a concern. But it would be unfair of me to say without really 
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researching it. [I] would like to think that people always have human 
beings’ interests in mind, but that isn’t always true. 
 -Representative of a nonprofit correctional facility operator 
Similarly, an organization that represented municipal governments claimed that 
“their business model requires them to have felonies. I can imagine they support 
sentencing enhancement.”  But when asked for a specific example he went on to say “[I 
have] never seen them on the sentencing portion of it…. I don’t see it, I don’t know.” 
When interviewees did provide examples of private prisons working on 
legislation that did affect sentencing, such legislation also contained other provisions of 
interest to private prisons. For instance, a left-wing group in Ohio described private 
prison support for House Bill 185 that would expand the definition of arson and allow 
more prosecutors, and that would also increase the ability of the state to place more 
prisoners in a prison owned by CoreCivic that at the time housed federal prisoners: 
 
x It’s lobbyists having conversations in the back room, you can definitely 
see the lobbyists and how much money is being spent on them. For 
example, some of these bills don’t go through the whole process with 
opportunities for testimony. It happens in the dead of night, happens the 
most in lame duck. . .. There was an arson bill that came up in general 
assembly, but that bill actually included private prison provisions that had 
nothing to do with arson. It basically gave the state the opportunity to send 
prisoners to the private federal prison. Within 24 hours it was passed, and 
the governor signed it into law, so I would think there were lots of 
conversation to get that provision added in and pushed through. 
 - Representative of a liberal advocacy group 
 
 This demonstrates political sophistication and influence on the part of private 
prisons in Ohio, which in theory could be used to lobby for higher rates of incarceration 
and longer sentences. Perhaps some additional arsonists will now find their way into 
private prisons. Yet, this law also has a clear gain to private prison firms besides 
increasing incarceration because it also expanded the ability of the state to house 
prisoners in private prisons. 
 Not all interest groups and legislators believed private prison firms lobbied on 
sentencing laws. While most private prison firms rejected my request for an interview, a 
representative of the private juvenile detention industry did speak with me.  The 
representative dismissed the concern that some have of private detention facilities and 
said that public and private detention facilities have the same incentives, and it’s up to the 
state to monitor them: 
x I think there’s a perspective that organizations with for- profit motives 
aren’t doing what is best for kids, and from our perspective it’s a matter of 
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contract management, making sure they’re holding up their end of the 
bargain just as you would with a public institution 
 
The representative did confirm that they spent more time engaging the executive branch 
than lobbying legislators but described his organization as spending most of their time on 
defensive lobbying. 
 Beyond the private sector, there were others who did not believe or had never 
seen private prisons engage on sentencing laws. No law enforcement organization, 
prosecutor association, victims’ rights group or any other organization associated with 
tough-on-crime laws described private prison firms as a political ally. Many respondents 
said private prisons were active on issues related to maintaining the existence of private 
prisons and rate per bed but not sentencing issues.  
● They are silent on all of the reforms; they push to further their position with 
regard to compensation. They’re worried about their facilities and not overall 
systemic issues. 
- Democratic Montana legislator 
● They’re concerned about their money and whether they’re going to get paid. 
- Representative of a law enforcement organization 
● They haven’t lobbied for harsher sentences. - Representative of a prosecutors’ organization 
● They only lobby on their contract and are more defensive. - Democratic Montana legislator 
There were cases of politicians supporting both private prisons and tougher 
sentencing laws, but that is not proof of private prisons pushing for increased 
incarceration. Support for tough-on-crime laws and support for private provision of 
services are both common political positions, especially within the right. These positions 
co-existed well before the modern introduction of private prisons. A Montana legislator 
who disliked private prisons and supported sentencing reform that would reduce prison 
population, described this challenge when discussing the introduction of a bill supporting 
private prisons by Republican legislators: 
● Legislators who brought the bill in were from Shelby and wanted to preserve the 
jobs that were there. And they were also the people who were against the 
sentencing [reform] bills but more than that they’re against the [Democratic] 
governor.  
This discrepancy, between the common belief that private prisons support 
incarceration and the lack of concrete examples in support is remarkable. One 
explanation is that private prisons do not behave in this way, and these beliefs are simply 
unfounded. Another explanation would be to emphasize the incentives for private prison 
firms to avoid being blamed for increasing incarceration and to obscure their close 
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relationships with the executive branch that both interest groups and legislators described 
private prison firms as utilizing. It is also possible that private prisons may achieve goals 
by providing “legislative subsidies” to friendly policy-makers, helping their allies be 
more successful in all their policy goals, only some of which are related to incarceration.  
Skeptics of the link between privatization and increased incarceration might also 
point to another result of these interviews. While respondents described private prison 
firms as politically sophisticated, they were not viewed as the most important actors on 
criminal justice issues. At the start of each interview, before asking respondents about the 
political agenda of private prison firms and corrections officer unions, I asked them about 
their political allies, opponents, and other interest groups that they viewed as the most 
active on criminal justice issues. Without being prompted to think about private prisons 
or corrections officer unions, many interest groups and legislators did not discuss them.  
So, despite many respondents describing private prisons as active and powerful, when 
asked specifically about them, private prisons were rarely top of mind. In contrast, 
prosecutors, the ACLU, and various law enforcement organizations were named 
frequently across all five states. 
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Table 5.8 
Five Most Referenced Interest Groups by State 
 
Rank Arizona 
 
California 
 
Montana 
 
Ohio 
 
Pennsylvania 
 
#1 ACLU    
 
ACLU ACLU Prosecutors Prosecutors 
#2 (Tie) 
Prosecutors; 
Goldwater 
Institute; 
Institute of 
Justice 
(Tie) 
Sheriffs, Law 
enforcement 
(unspecified) 
 (Tie) 
Prosecutors, 
Sheriffs 
Judges (Tie) 
ACLU, 
Fraternal Order 
of Police 
#3    Public 
Defenders 
 
#4  Prosecutors  (Tie) 
ACLU, Defense 
Attorneys 
Corrections 
Officers 
#5 (Tie) 
Chiefs of 
Police, Defense 
Attorneys, 
Right on Crime 
 
Police Chiefs (Tie) 
Private prisons, 
community 
corrections, 
Disability 
Rights Montana 
 Trial Lawyers 
 
  Correctional interests rank among the five most mentioned interest groups in only 
a few states.  Only in Montana were private prisons mentioned by enough respondents to 
land in fifth place. Corrections officer unions reached the top five of interest groups only 
in Pennsylvania where they ranked fourth. In California, home of the well-known 
CCPOA, corrections officer unions were the sixth most mentioned interest group. 
By sheer frequency of mentions, the ACLU and prosecutor associations dominate, 
ranking in the top five in every state. Other interest groups frequently mentioned across 
states are other legal groups, judges, defense and trial lawyers, as well as various law 
enforcement organizations. From my interviews, prosecutors stand out as the preeminent 
interest group. While the ACLU is comparable in how frequently it was mentioned, the 
content of the interviews painted a picture of prosecutors as an independent and 
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formidable interest group that both legislators and other interest groups sought to win 
over to their side on criminal justice issues. 
 Multiple respondents explicitly said that prosecutor organizations were the most 
important organization in their state. Further, legislators in discussing prosecutors 
displayed a surprising amount of deference to the views of prosecutors, reaching out to 
solicit prosecutors’ opinions or even revising legislation to win their approval. 
● We text back and forth with the district attorneys of the communities [I represent]. 
We would ask the association if we didn’t hear from them. 
- Republican Pennsylvania legislator 
● We are in negotiations with the prosecutors in an effort to allay their concerns. I 
think if we . . . get to some modus vivendi the bill will pass. In the world of 
criminal justice in the legislature, I find, that because so many members aren’t 
lawyers, they’re inclined to show great deference to the views of prosecuting 
attorneys around the state. You should understand that prosecutors are elected on 
a county basis, so each member of the assembly has at least one and sometimes 
more than one prosecutor who is a constituent and is locally elected, and 
oftentimes has great influence among voters. If you’re doing something at the 
capital and the local prosecutor thinks it’s a dumb idea, the local county 
prosecutors can advocate. We have to work with the prosecutors. 
- Republican Ohio legislator 
Interest group respondents also recognized the influence and power of 
prosecutors, often in terms of describing negotiations with prosecutors in order to 
craft an acceptable bill or describing their recent political activity such as engaging in 
prosecuting attorney elections within Pennsylvania.   
 
Strong enough to matter? 
 
Is it reasonable to believe that private prison firms are able to increase 
incarceration? On one hand, they’re politically active, sophisticated, adopt proactive 
strategies, and spend substantial sums on politics. On the other hand, private prison 
firms are overshadowed by other actors. I believe it is, for two reasons.  
The first is that it is not necessary to be the most powerful organized interest 
group in one’s domain to win policy victories.  Baumgartner et al. (2009) found only 
a weak relationship between policy victories and resources relative to political 
opponents. Further, in many states with private prisons, private prisons may have 
faced little political opposition to pro-incarceration advocacy for many of the years 
during which they operated. My interviews and examination of recent lobbying 
records show that currently there are many organized interest groups that prioritize 
reducing incarceration, yet these groups were not all active during the 1980s, 1990s 
or 2000s.   
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 Second, private prison firms have a unique relationship to incarceration in that 
they benefit from its expansion much more than other interest groups. Pfaff (2017) 
described prosecutors as playing a central role in the massive expansion of US 
incarceration over the past several decades. Pfaff argued that prosecutors have multiple 
reasons to support policies that increase incarceration. Prosecutors are elected at the local 
level, win credit for successfully convicting criminals in their local communities, but the 
costs of incarceration are borne by the state. Prosecutors may also harbor individual 
ambitions for higher office and see a tough-on-crime approach as beneficial to their 
political futures.  Prosecutors may believe that the political risk of failing to prosecute a 
suspect who goes on to commit another crime is much higher than the risk of prosecuting 
too aggressively. Be this as it may, incarceration is only an instrumental value to 
prosecutors. Incarceration is a terminal value for private prison firms. 
 Elected politicians, other than prosecutors, sometimes supported tougher 
sentencing laws as well. However, this support did not appear particularly deep-rooted. It 
appeared that legislators felt compelled to respond to high-profile criminal cases, 
although it did not always lead to substantive policy change if it was an unpromising 
political environment. One faith-based criminal justice reformer in California said they 
spent their time swatting down what he called “tombstone bills” or bills named after the 
victims of violent crime. A former state senator in California who had a left-wing 
criminal justice agenda agreed that many tough-on-crime bills were prompted by heinous 
crimes, or by the failure of a prosecutor to achieve conviction. However, she doubted that 
most of these bills meaningfully changed laws, saying that “the reason that the penal code 
is so thick” is that those bills were watered down with caveats and exemptions and that 
the “the only time we would kill [one of these bills] is when the author wouldn’t 
compromise.” 
 A current example of this is the Reagan Tokes Act in Ohio, which was being 
considered by the Ohio legislature while I conducted interviews. Named after the 
murdered college student allegedly killed by a man on parole who was insufficiently 
supervised and allegedly committed multiple robberies before the murder, the bill would 
increase resources for parole supervision and allow longer sentences for convicts who 
receive conduct sanctions while imprisoned.  Among the Ohio interest groups, I spoke to, 
the bill had broad support. Yet none of these groups nor the legislators supportive of 
these bills described it as a long-running political ambition to improve the parole or 
sentencing system, it appears to be very much a response to the murder.  
 Over the course of these interviews it became clear that there are very few 
interest groups that support tough-on-crime policies.  Groups which supported tougher 
sentencing laws were conspicuous in their almost total absence outside of the law 
enforcement and prosecutor organizations. The exceptions were a few crime victim 
groups or sexual or domestic assault groups, which supported increased penalties in very 
specific cases. In part this may have reflected the preponderance of left-leaning groups 
among ideological or civil society groups. However, even among groups that were 
conservative or libertarian, the issues they were concerned with would generally reduce 
incarceration or limit law enforcement powers. Reducing the use of civil asset forfeiture 
was of major concern to conservative and libertarian groups. There was also interest in 
reducing corrections spending among right-leaning groups. 
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In this climate, where political support for increased incarceration is shallow 
among politicians, and rare among interest groups, the entrance of a focused interest 
group that cared about increased incarceration could make a large impact. With few 
political actors working to boost incarceration, there may be substantial low-hanging fruit 
in policy terms, that can increase incarceration. Private prison firms expend substantial 
amounts on politics, are viewed as influential by other actors in the criminal justice arena 
and would uniquely benefit from increased incarceration. If private prison firms wanted 
to increase incarceration, they would be in a position to do so. Many respondents believe 
that is what private prison firms seek, but they did not provide clear proof. 
. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 In this concluding chapter, I discuss what the political influence of private prisons 
means for the criminal justice system and what it implies about the likely future of 
criminal justice reform. I also discuss what the distinct political strategies of business and 
labor unions implies about the shaping of public policy more broadly from colleges and 
universities to K-12 education to defense spending.  
 
The Scope of Private Prison Political Influence  
 
 Private prison firms are important political actors. They spend large sums on state 
and federal politics. They cultivate close relationships with state executive branches. 
They are politically sophisticated and have a proactive political agenda. States that adopt 
private prisons see their prison populations grow substantially, and consequently 
spending on incarceration grows. Privatization does not drive incarceration growth by 
making incarceration cheaper because per prisoner cost of incarceration appears 
unaffected by privatization. Private prisons do not solve prison crowding because less 
crowded prison systems experience larger increases in incarceration per capita when 
prisons are privatized. 
 The number of additional prisoners that prison privatization generates is 
substantial. In 2014, states that used for-profit private prisons had a population of 
approximately 194 million. Depending on model specification, this suggests that prison 
privatization caused an aggregate additional 58 thousand to 105 thousand prisoners in 
2014 in the states that privatized prisons.  
Although private prisons contribute to the high rate of incarceration in the United 
States, they do not explain the exceptionally high incarceration rate. The United States 
currently has the world’s highest incarceration rate, approximately 655 prisoners per 
100,000 people (ICPR, 2019). Even if the United States were to eliminate private prisons 
causing an expected decrease in incarceration by 30-50 prisoners per 100,000 people in 
states with private prisons, the United States would still rank first among countries by 
incarceration rate. 
 
Private Prisons and Criminal Justice Reform 
 
 If the difference between private prison firms and corrections officer unions is 
driven by their different attitudes about growth, then these differences should become 
less salient when mass incarceration is facing increased political resistance from both 
parties as it is in 2019. Private prisons which were a potent and distinctive force for 
increased incarceration may not be so unique when it comes to resisting efforts to shrink 
the prison population, because closing prisons directly threatens the jobs of current 
corrections officers. Therefore, we might expect that in states with weak or non-existent 
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corrections officer unions, private prisons might be an important actor fighting against 
reduced incarceration; in states with corrections officer unions private prisons may not be 
as uniquely impactful. 
  Private prison firms are becoming major providers of alternatives to incarceration 
such as electronic monitoring and residential-reentry programs (Holland, 2016). As 
private for-profit firms gain market share in providing alternatives to incarceration, these 
firms should be expected to lobby for expanding alternatives to incarceration, just as 
private prison firms lobbied for increased incarceration. Corrections officer unions that 
cannot guarantee the placement of their current members in different fields or different 
careers may be even more compelled to oppose shrinking the prison population than 
private firms are. Prison privatization contributed to the increase in incarceration, but that 
does not mean that private prison firms will be an important obstacle to reducing 
incarceration. Further, given that they are not viewed as the most powerful political actor 
in criminal justice policy, broadening interest in decreasing mass incarceration among 
other political actors is likely to dilute their future political influence of private prison 
firms.  
 
Parochial Labor Unions 
 
 Compared to private prison firms, corrections officer unions are deeply 
outmaneuvered. From smaller lobbying budgets to less political sophistication and 
presence at state capitols, corrections officer unions are not a major influence on criminal 
justice policy. The once feared California Correctional Peace Officers Association is a 
shadow of its former political influence. Legislators and lobbyists viewed corrections 
officer unions as insular and focused on narrow bread-and-butter issues. The natural logic 
of labor unions appears to prevail when it comes to corrections officer unions. Union 
leadership serves the interests of the current members who care about wages, benefits, 
retirement, and personal safety in a high-stress job. Corrections officer unions do not 
prioritize growing their membership by seeking increased incarceration. 
 How can this be reconciled with other accounts of the California Correctional 
Peace Officers Association past activities? How can it be reconciled with my own 
interviews where many respondents indicated that the CCPOA was more proactive in the 
past? The nature of labor unions has not changed in the last twenty years, yet the 
behavior of the CCPOA has changed dramatically. 
 I believe the answer lies with the ability of committed union leaders or activists to 
press against the default tendency of labor unions. Page (2011) described in detail the 
individual entrepreneurial leaders who shaped the CCPOA. When Page discussed a 
possible change in CCPOA’s political direction, he discussed how the change from one 
union president to another might shift CCPOA’s approach to public policy.  
 The same shifting dynamic can be seen in labor unions in general. Individual 
committed leaders or cadres of political activists can cause labor unions to (at least 
temporarily) embrace broader goals than the immediate material interests of their 
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members. Consider the disproportionate role that Communists played in 20th century 
union organizing. Lichtenstein (2013) wrote:  
Such radicals were and are essential to the organization of a trade union 
movement, in the United States even more so than in countries with an established 
socialist tradition. Indeed, if it were left to those whose aspirations were shaped 
merely by the trade union idea, most labor drives would have died at birth. This is 
because the founding of a trade union is a personally risky business whose costs 
and dangers are disproportionately born by those who take the early initiative. (p. 
45) 
 
Because much of the benefit of labor union growth (or creation!) goes to future members 
rather than current members (or founders), labor union growth is likely to be heavily 
driven by outliers who are motivated by altruism or ideology. Just as some individual 
labor organizations might be motivated by left-wing ideology, there likely are individual 
leaders among corrections officer unions that prize growth due to a commitment to public 
safety, law-and-order policies, or the desire to lead a larger union. 
  Because union growth depends on redirecting union resources to efforts that are 
not in the immediate interests of current union members, such proactive union leadership 
risks backlash.  The policies of Andy Stern, former president of the Service Employees 
International Union (SEIU) met with such backlash. 
 In 2008, SEIU had announced an ambitious plan to organize an additional 
500,000 workers within five years. This hugely ambitious plan was pushed by the SEIU’s 
president, Andy Stern, who argued: 
Do we use our bargaining power, political strength, and financial and human 
resources to try to raise or maintain standards . . . only for our current members?  
Or do we focus the strength we still have on building a broader movement that 
also improves living standards and working conditions for all those who now have 
no union?" (Fraser, 2009, p.49).   
The plan aimed to draw additional members from government workers, health care 
employees, and those in the building industry (Early, 2011).  Such an ambitious and 
outward focused plan fit SEIU’s reputation as a progressive “social justice union” (Early, 
2011). 
  However, tensions were immediately apparent between the goal of 
massive membership and democratic control of the labor union by its members.  In fact, 
this tension had a long history within SEIU. A report commissioned by SEIU described 
the mid-1990’s replacement of John Sweeney with Dick Cordtz as head of SEIU as 
returning to a “traditional union” and thus having “greater local autonomy and a weaker 
commitment to organizing.” (Eaton, Fine, Porter, and Rubinstein, 2009, p. 7).  And now 
Stern was pushing for greater centralized control of the constituent unions of SEIU and 
for unions to commit 20% of their resources to organizing new members (Eaton, Fine, 
Porter, and Rubinstein, 2009).  
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 Even worse, according to his critics was Stern’s willingness to grow SEIU by 
“subordinating the interests of the existing membership to the demands of organizing the 
potential membership” (Meyerson, 2009, para. 13). For instance, Stern would exchange 
promises of only pursuing moderate wages and benefits or worse conditions if employers 
would stay neutral in unionization drives (Fraser, 2010). When SEIU was bargaining with 
the hospital chain, Tenet, SEIU negotiated an agreement with Tenet that would make 
organizing easier at non-union Tenet hospitals. But SEIU sacrificed the right to strike in 
California, allowed Tenet to subcontract part of its workforce, failed to improve 
healthcare or pensions, and other job security provisions (Early, 2011). 
 Stern also pursued growth in membership by absorbing smaller unions to grow 
SEIU’s numbers and political influence, which opponents have said has led to worse 
representation of current members (Fraser, 2010; Meyerson, 2009).  Stern’s methods led 
to a major fight with United Health Workers which said SEIU was negotiating inferior 
contracts for the existing membership (Meyerson, 2009). This cost SEIU not only support 
among union members but also among “labor-oriented academics” (Early, 2009), such as 
those that teach at labor studies centers. SEIU even faced allegations that it was 
dispatching union thugs to threaten rival union organizers in Detroit (Shaw, 2010). Stern 
may have antagonized union members through specific tactics and strategic choices. But 
the SEIU was not the first labor union to stumble after its leadership decided it should 
focus more on organizing new member. 
 Periodically, other unions had tried to refocus on union organizing. A pro-
organizing slate won leadership elections for the AFL-CIO in 1995, but the commitment 
faded without meaningful change (Aleks, 2015). In 2005, several large unions including 
SEIU withdrew from the AFL-CIO to create the Change to Win Federation. However, the 
unions that left the AFL-CIO did not improve at organizing new workers after leaving the 
AFL-CIO (Aleks, 2015).  
 Unions can be proactive and pursue broad political goals. They have in the past, 
and some unions continue to do so. However, it is not typical. This is not to say that 
unions, particularly public employee unions, do not influence the political process or 
public policy.  
Public employee unions can increase government spending on employee salaries and 
pensions, sometimes to a substantial amount. Unions can increase voter turnout among 
their members and influence voter choice. But we should not expect labor unions to 
lobby proactively for the expansion of their industry, whether corrections or any other 
industry. 
 
Beyond Corrections 
 
 What can the case of the corrections industry tell us about the politics of 
privatization more generally? What can it tell us about the behavior of private firms and 
labor unions more generally?  We should see the same pattern of proactive firms and 
defensive labor unions across other industries. When governments, state, local or federal, 
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privatize a service by turning to private contractors we should see an increase in lobbying 
aimed at getting governments to expand provision of that service. However, even though 
the same dynamics should prevail in other industries, private prisons are an exceptional 
case because private prisons hold meaningful market share in many states, the private 
prison industry is relatively concentrated, and governments are the only consumer of their 
primary services. For these reason, private prison firms had much greater incentives to 
seek the expansion of their industry than is typical, and the political effects of 
privatization is likely less dramatic when it comes to other government services, such as 
K-12 education. 
2018 and 2019 have seen major teacher strikes across the country, in West 
Virginia, Oklahoma, Kentucky, Arizona, Colorado, North Carolina, and California 
(Atkinson, 2019)). In some of these strikes such as those in Los Angeles and Oakland, 
demands have not only included higher compensation for teachers but also a moratorium 
on future charter schools (Freedberg, 2019). The teacher strikes in Oakland and Los 
Angeles both resulted in the district agreeing to support a charter school moratorium 
(Harrington, 2019; Swaak, 2019).  Because the expansion of charter schools poses a 
threat to current union members, it makes sense for teacher unions to seek a moratorium 
on charter school expansion. However, they have less reason to try to close charter 
schools that already exist because gaining market share back from charter schools might 
be primarily to the benefit of future teacher union members who might be hired to teach 
the additional students. Both the Los Angeles and Oakland teachers’ strikes also 
demanded smaller classes. While smaller class sizes likely necessitate the hiring of more 
teachers, it also directly improves the working conditions of current union members. Here 
we see the familiar dynamic of unions primarily working to benefit their current 
members, but not trying to grow their industry by, for example, shutting down existing 
charter schools or attacking private schools. 
Publicly funded privately operated educational providers have yet to play a major 
role in expanding the educational system, unlike   the corrections system. Part of this may 
be due to the difficulty of expanding the student population relative to the prison 
population. While there may be some opportunities to expand the number of students, 
such as publicly funded preschools or raising the school dropout age, there is probably 
less room for increasing the number of primary and secondary school students than there 
is for increasing the number of prisoners.  Another major difference is that many private 
providers are nonprofit and that even the largest private providers of education have a 
relatively small market share. This fragmentation of publicly funded private schools and 
charter school operators creates a vast free-riding challenge to those considering 
investing in advocacy for the sake of expanding government provision of education. 
Charter schools totaled only 5% of schools by 2014 (NCES, 2017). Among charter 
schools, the largest operator, KIPP, has only 88,000 students (Barth, 2017) or roughly 3% 
of all charter school students. Further, KIPP, is a nonprofit and thus lacks the structural 
incentives for growth that private for-profit firms have. The role of for-profit firms in 
charter schools is small in general. Roughly 20% of students in charter schools attended 
schools managed by for-profit firms, with the rest split between nonprofit chains and 
free-standing nonprofits that operate a single school or district (National Alliance for 
Public Charter Schools, 2019). For-profit schools also lack a major presence in providing 
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education to those using school vouchers as most students who use vouchers attend 
religious schools (Hanauer, 2002; Ultican, 2018).  
Post-secondary education has a much different dynamic. For-profit colleges or 
universities account for 915,00 undergraduates or 5.4% of undergraduate college 
students. (NCES, 2018). A handful of for-profit college providers dominate this sector. 
The University of Phoenix had an enrollment of 165,743, almost a fifth of all 
undergraduate students enrolled in for-profit colleges (NCES, 2018). Other large for-
profit providers were Walden University and the ironically named American Public 
University System, which together had about 11% of for-profit undergraduate students. 
Given their meaningful share of the total higher education market and the relative 
concentration of the for-profit section, these firms have strong incentives to lobby the 
government on behalf of expanding the higher education industry, in terms of both total 
spending and student enrollment. In contrast, faculty unions, such as the American 
Association of University Professors, have less reason to lobby on behalf of expanding 
the higher education industry. Figure 5.1 shows the recent lobbying expenditures of the 
parent company of the University of Phoenix, Apollo Education Group, and The 
American Association of University Professors. 
 
Figure 5.1 
Higher Education Lobbying Expenditures  
 
 
 The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) does not lobby. Not 
on education funding or student loan eligibility or any other issue. Perhaps they are active 
on higher education policy in other ways, but in one of the major areas of political 
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engagement they are completely absent. Further, none of the unions that AAUP listed as 
affiliated with their association (AAUP, n.d.) reported any lobbying in the last four years.  
 . The relationship between for-profit colleges and faculty unions is similar to the 
relationship between private prisons and corrections officer unions. Both for-profit 
colleges and private prisons provide services that are often delivered directly by state 
governments, are in some sense in competition for market share with public providers 
and are heavily funded by the government. There are some differences. There are non-
government consumers for higher education for instance. Still, this shows another 
industry where the relevant labor union lacks political presence while the for-profit 
counterpart is heavily politically engaged. 
 
The Defense Industry 
 
Corrections is different than education because the only consumers of correctional 
services are governments. The same is largely true of the defense industry. Defense 
contractors have strong incentives to pursue increased military spending. Unlike the 
corrections industry, defense contractors do not compete with a unionized public 
workforce for market share. In theory, defense contractors should be even more strongly 
motivated to pursue increases in military spending than are private prison firms as they 
possess much higher market share. 
Private military contractors, that is, firms that that provide security or combat 
services, do compete with a public workforce, the military. However, soldiers, sailors, 
airmen, and other members of the U.S.  military are prohibited from unionizing. If 
members of the military were permitted to organize, they presumably would work to 
improve working conditions and compensation for themselves. Private military 
contractors, in contrast, would be more likely to seek to increase their share of the 
military services market, either by supplanting the military or even by seeking to expand 
military activity by supporting increased interventionism. A theoretical military labor 
union would have little incentive to increase military activity.  
Because the military is not unionized, it is not possible to compare how politically 
active military labor unions are relative to defense contractors or private military 
contractors. The closest existing analogue to military labor unions is veterans service 
organizations which represent the interests of U.S.  veterans. Veterans service 
organizations have an incentive to care about the welfare of current military members as 
current military members will eventually become veterans. Veterans service organization 
engage in political advocacy. Some veterans service organizations also represent veterans 
making claims for benefits to the Department of Veteran Affairs (VA, 2017) which is 
analogous to labor unions representing employees and retirees. How active are these 
veterans service organizations compared to defense contractors and private military 
contractors? Not very. Figure 5.2 compares lobbying expenditures of the major veterans 
service organizations, dubbed the “Big Six,” to the lobbying expenditures of the six 
largest domestic defense contractors (Aitoro, 2018; Shane, 2018). 
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Figure 5.2 
Lobbying Expenditures of Largest Veterans Organizations and Defense 
Contractors 
2015-2018 
 
 
 
 The lobbying expenditures of the major veterans service organizations are almost 
nonexistent relative to the lobbying expenditures of the largest defense contractors. The 
groups that represent the interests of retired workers, at least by this measure, engage 
minimally in politics relative to the firms that are active in the same issue areas. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite the perception of business interests as being aligned with the political 
right, business interests may very well be among the least small-c conservative actors in 
the United States. The incentives for growth are much stronger for corporations than they 
are for labor unions and nonprofits. Further, money is fungible which allows firms to be 
indifferent to how growth in profits is achieved. Jobs are not fungible so the political 
priorities of public employee unions will center around protecting the jobs and 
compensation of current union members.  Consequently, the political consequences of 
privatizing a particular government function is likely to be less predictable and more 
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consequential than would be union organization within the government. No matter the 
public union, teachers, firefighters, or police, the basic consequence is likely the same: 
demands for higher compensation and the resulting fiscal consequences when that is 
achieved. Private providers of government services may focus on supplanting public 
providers of government services, seeking to expand provision of that service, or both.  
Since privatization of a government service can generate political pressure to 
expand a government service, privatization motivated by cost-saving may backfire. This 
is especially likely where private provision of these services is heavily concentrated, so 
firms are less affected by free-riding among firms. It is also likely to be more common 
where private firms already have substantial market share and so have greater incentive 
to lobby the government on behalf of expanding the government service instead of 
simply trying to increase their market share. 
That business is a powerful political actor is not a new idea. Nor is it new to point 
out that business dominates politically lobbying by many measures, as Drutman (2015) 
demonstrates. What is new is that businesses and labor unions that fulfill similar roles in 
providing government services, behave in radically different ways, with business being 
more politically engaged and more proactive than similarly situated labor unions. Even if 
labor union density were as high as it was at its mid-20th century peak, business would 
likely dominate labor in terms of political activity. The differences between labor unions 
and business in political strategy and engagement is inherent to their structures. Business 
has great incentives for growth; labor unions do not. Business is a strong and ambitious 
political actor, and always will be.  
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Appendix A: Dates of Privatization  
 
To determine if a state did not use private prisons at any point from 1980 to 2014, I checked 
media sources, the scholarly literature, National Prisoner Statistics, and the Census of State and 
Adult Correctional Facilities. Sixteen states never used for-profit private prisons. 
 
 
Alabama 
 
Alabama began shipping men and women to out-of-state private prisons in 2003 (Green & 
Pranis, 2005). In 2008, Alabama Therapeutic Education Facility opened (Davis, 2017). 
 
Alaska 
 
Men were held in private prisons out-of-state beginning in 1995 (ACLU, 2010). 
AllVest was founded in 1985 to run halfway houses for both sexes (Demer, 2016; Munger, 
2011). 
 
Arizona 
 
First began to house men in private prisons in 1994 (MTC, 2012). 
Arizona did not house women in private prisons (AFSC, 2010; Tucson Local Media, 2003). 
 
Arkansas 
 
The state used private prisons from 1998 to 2002 for both sexes (Arkansas Department of 
Corrections, 2019). 
 
California 
 
California began using private prisons for men in 1986 and women in 1988 (GAO, 1991). 
 
Colorado 
 
Began using private prisons in 1995 for both sexes (Thomas, 1994). Tooley House for women 
continues to operate, as do multiple male prisons. 
 
Florida 
 
Women were held in private prisons beginning in 1995 (Florida Department of Corrections, 
2019). Men were held in for-profit community corrections beginning in 1985 (Dubail, 1990; 
Florida Department of Corrections, 1986). 
 
Georgia 
 
Georgia began use in 1998 (Georgia Department of Corrections, 2019). 
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Hawaii 
 
Women were sent to private prisons beginning in 1997 (Talvi, 2006). Men were sent beginning 
in 1995 (Advertiser Staff, 2005). 
 
Idaho 
 
Began use of private prisons in 1997 for male prisoners (Associated Press, 2014). 
 
Indiana 
 
The state began housing men in private prisons in 1998 (Prison Legal News, 1999). 
 
Kentucky 
 
The state began housing men in private prisons in 1986 (GAO, 1991), and stopped in 2013 
(Correctional News, 2013). 
 
The state began housing women in private prisons in 2002 (National Prisoner Statistics). Otter 
Creek Facility switched from housing male to female prisoners (Census of State and Federal 
Correctional Facilities), and stopped in 2010 (Prison Legal News, 2011). 
 
 
Louisiana 
 
The state began holding men in 1990 (GAO, 1991). 
 
 
Michigan 
 
The state had a prison for young male offenders, including young adults, from 1998-2005 (Egan, 
2019). It included nineteen-year-old men (Boals, 1998). 
 
Minnesota 
Male prisoners were privately held from 2004 to 2010 (CCA, 2005; Mannix, 2017). 
 
Mississippi 
 
The state began use of private prisons in 1996 (Mukherjee, 2017). 
 
Montana 
 
The state began holding male prisoners in 1999 (Curless, 1999). 
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Nevada 
 
Women were held in for-profit prisons from 1997 to 2003 (Botkin, 2017). 
 
 
New Jersey 
 
Community Education Centers, a for-profit firm, began to operate centers in New Jersey in 1996 
on behalf of EHCA (John Paff v. Community Education Centers, 2013). 
 
New Mexico 
 
Private prisons were first used for women in 1989 (GAO, 1991). They were first used for men in 
1998 (New Mexico Department of Corrections, 2013). 
 
North Carolina 
 
North Carolina had private prisons for men and women from 1998 to 2000 (NCDPS, 2019), but 
kept smaller ones for drug treatment for men and women until 2011 (NCDC, 2011). 
 
North Dakota 
 
Sent prisoners out-of-state until 2010 (Associated Press, 2015). Started sending male prisoners 
out-of-state in 2004 (Groenevald, 2004). 
 
Ohio 
 
Began use of private prisons for men in 2000 (Hallett & Hanauer, 2001). 
 
Oklahoma 
 
The state began use of private prisons in 1996 for men and 1997 for women (Oklahoma 
Department of Corrections, 2019). 
 
Pennsylvania 
 
Pennsylvania has held male and female prisoners in private prisons since 2001 (National 
Prisoner Statistics). ADDAPT is owned by the GEO Group (Turner, 2017; Census of State and 
Federal Correctional Facilities). Penn Pavilion also holds male and female inmates referred by 
the state (GEO Group, 2017). 
 
South Dakota 
 
Began housing men and women in 1992 and discontinued housing men in 2004 (Daly, 2006). 
 
 
 98 
Tennessee 
 
Prison privatization began in 1984 for both sections (Tolchin, 1984). 
 
Texas 
 
Men were first held in private prisons in 1984 (GAO, 1991). Women were first held in private 
prisons in 1987 (GAO, 1991; National Institute of Justice, 1990). 
 
Utah 
 
Utah held men in for-profit private “Promontory Unit” Management & Training Corp. from 1994 
to 2001 (Adams, 2001; Christian, 2001). 
 
 
Vermont 
 
Vermont held prisoners in for-profit prisons from 2004 to at least 2017 (Hewitt, 2017; 
Stephenson, 2004). 
 
Virginia 
 
Began use for men in 1998 (Finn, 1998). 
 
Washington 
 
Held male prisoners in out-of-state private prisons, but discontinued use in 2010 (Jenkins, 2015). 
Started being held in 2004 (AFSC, 2010). 
 
Wisconsin 
 
Sent male prisoners out-of-state from 1998 to 2005 (Walters, 2017). 
 
Wyoming 
 
Began sending prisoners, male and female, out-of-state to for-profit prisons in 1997 (Barron, 
2009). 
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Appendix B: Formal Model 
 
 In Chapter 2, I conclude that if private prison firms benefit more from increased 
incarceration than do corrections officer unions, private prison firms may lobby more intensely 
for increased incarceration than do corrections officer unions, even if private prison firms have 
relatively low market share. In this appendix I expand upon this argument with a simple formal 
model. I introduce a basic model of lobbying where both for-profit prison firms and public sector 
unions representing correctional workers are able to lobby for increased levels of incarceration, 
or to lobby against reductions in the number of prisoners.  
 
Labor Union Preferences 
 
For this model, I assume that union members are self-interested, and do not, for altruistic 
reasons, care about future union members. I assume that a single labor union represents only 
corrections officers and represents all publicly employed corrections officers within a single 
jurisdiction. I assume that all corrections officers are identical, and that corrections officers’ 
utility is a function of their total compensation. 
As the result of union representation, each corrections officer receives higher wages than 
he or she would if he or she were not employed as a unionized corrections officer. I denote this 
wage premium as w. Each union member receives this wage premium only when he or she is 
employed in a public corrections system and is represented by the labor union. Therefore, the 
utility of a union member is a function of the size of the wage premium and the probability that 
they remain employed as a public corrections officer. Let e be the number of workers who are 
employed as corrections officer in both the public and private section, and let eL be the number 
of union members that are employed as public correction corrections officers during any period. 
Let m be the number of union members.  The expected compensation of any union member is the 
probability that they receive a wage premium and the amount of the wage premium. The 
expected utility of any union member can be written: 
E(UL)=௘௅
௠
*w (1). 
 
 I assume that the number of corrections officers employed, in both the public and private 
sector, is a function of the number of prisoners, p, and a constant staffing ratio, r, such that p*r is 
the number of total corrections officers employed.  
 Either the labor union or any number of n identical private prison firms can expend 
money on pro-incarceration advocacy. Total dollars spent on pro-incarceration advocacy is the 
sum of any such advocacy by the labor union, aL, and that of each of the n firms, naF.  
a=aL+naF (2). 
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The total number of prisoners in a jurisdiction can be increased by spending on political 
advocacy from some baseline number of prisoners, with advocacy dollars having diminishing 
marginal returns. Let the number of prisoners in a given period be a function of both some 
baseline level of prisoners, p0, and advocacy spending. The total number of prisoners is given by: 
p=√a+p0 (3). 
 
 Let any change in the number of prisoners affect the public and private sector 
proportionally to their current market share, with sL and sF, denoting the market share of the 
unionized public sector and the private sector respectively.  
 Because the labor union represents all public corrections officers and only public 
corrections officers at the start of any period, all its members are employed such that: 
eL=m (4). 
 
and that consequently each union members’ utility is equal to  
UL=w- ௔ಽ
௠
  (5). 
 
The labor union could choose to spend on pro-incarceration advocacy. This would increase the 
employment in the public sector as both a function of the public sector’s market share and the 
staffing ratio. However, it would not increase the wage premium even though it would increase  
the dues paid by union members. Pro-incarceration advocacy does not provide any benefit to the 
union members. Therefore, the optimal level of pro-incarceration advocacy to increase 
incarceration by the labor union is: 
aL*=0 (6). 
 
 
Private Prison Firm Preferences 
 
 Where the labor union maximizes the utility of its members, I model the firms as trying 
to maximize the utility of their shareholders. I assume all private prison firms are able to avoid 
unionization. Consequently, the wage premium does not exist within the private sector. Instead, 
the savings on wages are paid out to shareholders as dividends. Consequently, as the number of 
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prisoners held by each private prison firm increases the wage savings increase and are shared by 
a static number of shareholders. Because the labor union has no incentive to lobby for increased 
incarceration, total advocacy spending is the sum of the (identical) spending by n identical firms. 
Let the utility function of the shareholders of each of the n private prison firms be written as:  
                 UF=p*r*w*sF*ଵ
௡
 -aF (7). 
 
 Ceteris paribus, each firm prefers there to be more prisoners, a higher staffing ratio, a 
higher wage premium, and a larger market share for the private sector. Recalling that the level of 
prisoners is determined by the level of advocacy spending, we can calculate that each firm 
should spend on pro-incarceration advocacy in order to increase incarceration with the optimal 
level of advocacy spending being: 
                   aF*= 𝑟
2𝑤2𝑠𝐹
2
4𝑛3
 (8). 
 
 As long as there is a positive wage premium, a positive staffing ratio, and private market 
share above zero, private firms should be willing to spend some amount of money on advocacy 
in order to increase incarceration. However, as the number of private firms increases, each firm 
is willing to spend less on advocacy. 
 
Behavior During Retrenchment 
 
 My model predicts that labor unions would have no incentive to invest in political 
advocacy because current labor union members would see no benefit from growth, but private 
for-profit corporations would invest in advocacy to increase the profits flowing to their 
shareholders. What happens if increases in incarceration are off the table? What if a wave of 
criminal justice reformers is elected and threaten to shut down or dramatically reduce 
incarceration, but corporations and labor unions have the ability to lobby against reducing the 
number of prisoners? 
 To simplify, we can assume that the threatened reforms are so large that each additional 
dollar of advocacy is valuable. That is, no amount of spending will be wasted or reverse the 
downward trend in incarceration. Consequently, union members are spending on advocacy 
purely to preserve employment of current members, and firms are spending on advocacy purely 
to preserve current profits. In this case, reducing prisoners would cost some current union 
members their jobs, as well as reducing corporate profits. This would give each labor union 
member a utility function of: 
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                 UL= ଵ
௠
∗p*r*w*sL* -௔ಽ
௠
 (9). 
  
Unlike the earlier scenario, the labor union and its members benefit from advocacy spending.  
When the union expects the firms to free-ride off the union’s advocacy spending, the optimal 
level on advocacy spending from the union’s perspective is: 
                       
a*= ௥
మ௪మ௦ಽ
మ
ସ
 (10). 
 
Union members are more willing to spend on advocacy when the union wage premium, public 
sector market share, and staffing ratio are high.  When the optimal advocacy level for the labor 
union is higher than it is for any private firm, each private firm knows that the labor union will 
spend up to the firm’s optimal point, and the firm will be able to free-ride off of the labor union. 
This would result in the labor union providing all advocacy spending up to the labor union’s 
optimal level. In this scenario, privatization of prisons would reduce the labor union’s advocacy 
against retrenchment because the utility of advocacy depends on the market share of the public 
sector. However, if each firm has sufficient market share that it is not able to fully free-ride off 
the labor union, the labor union will be able to free-ride off the advocacy spending of the firms.  
 
What if Unions Value Growth? 
 
 What if unions get some benefit from growth? Current union members might get 
psychological benefits, such as class solidarity, for providing union jobs for other workers. Or 
labor unions might gain political leverage as they grow and might be able to increase wages for 
their current members. There may be principal-agent problems, where union leadership does not 
perfectly serve the interests of union members, and instead union leaders might seek growth for 
their own reasons. If this is true, then the effect of privatization on advocacy aimed at increasing 
incarceration is more ambiguous, and the results will depend on the relative valuation of 
increased incarceration between labor unions and firms, as well as the relative market of the two 
sectors. 
 If the labor union and its members value an additional prisoner held in the public sector 
as some fraction, f, of the value a private prison firm places on an additional prisoner held in its 
prison, then the effect of privatization on advocacy that aims to increase incarceration, depends 
on the values of f and the market share of the labor union and firms. Each labor union member 
would then have a utility function of: 
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                 UL=f*p*r*w*sL+ w- ௔ಽ
௠
 (11). 
 
If the product of f and sL is greater than  ௦ಷ
௡
 then the labor union will spend on advocacy in order 
to increase incarceration, and private prison firms will be able to free-ride. If the product of f and 
sL is less than ௦ಷ
௡
, the labor union will free-ride off of the pro-incarceration advocacy of the 
private prison firms. In this scenario, the effect of privatization on total pro-incarceration 
advocacy spending is ambiguous. If the labor union spends on pro-incarceration advocacy, it will 
spend less when it has to share the market with private prison firms. If instead private prison 
firms spend on advocacy, they may spend more or less than would the labor union in the absence 
of privatization. In any case, the private prison firms are more likely to spend money on 
advocacy than would a labor union with the same market share. 
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Appendix C: Interview Questions 
 
Interest Group Questions 
 
1. Can you tell me about a recent political issue your group worked on related to criminal 
justice? 
2. How did your group learn about that issue? 
3. How did your group decide to get involved on that issue? 
4. Who are the other key actors on this issue? How do you relate to them? 
a. Who was on your side? 
b. Who was on the other side? 
5. What are the main barriers you faced in achieving your goals? 
6. What were the tactics you used to achieve your goal? 
7. What was the result of the campaign? 
8. On issues related to criminal justice, what percent of your effort is spent on proactive 
campaigns?  
9. On issues related to criminal justice, what percent of your effort is spent on defensive 
campaigns or campaigns trying to prevent negative changes? 
10. What groups are most active on criminal justice related issues? 
11. When it comes to political campaigns related to criminal justice, what percent of the 
effort of law enforcement labor unions go into proactive campaigns? Defensive 
campaigns? 
12. How does that compare to the work of corrections officer unions? 
13. How does that compare to private prison operators? 
14. How does that compare to civil society or ideological groups? 
 
 
 
